http://www.liveleak.com/browse?q=Islamist Sat, 18 May 2013 07:53:26 -0400 Liveleak http://edge.liveleak.com/80281E/u/u/ll2/logo.gif http://www.liveleak.com/browse?q=Islamist Fri, 17 May 2013 16:55:36 -0400 http://www.liveleak.com/view?i=e6f_1368823944 english-patriot33 http://europegonemad.wordpress.com/2013/05/17/eu-donates-e-5-billion-to-islamic-fundamentalist-regime-in-egypt/ EU donates EUR 5 billion to islamic fundamentalist regime in Egypt The European Union decided to give EUR 5.000.000.000 (yes, 5 billion!) to Egypt, to support the process of democratisation in the country. Let's see what that really means. The new powers in Egypt want to introduce Sharia, which means woman, christians (koptic), etc.. will be surpressed; and freedom of speech will be non-existing. Egyptian President Mohammed Morsi officially signed into law a new constitution drafted by his own Muslim Brotherhood and other Islamist groups, and which critics say has effectively placed Egypt under strict Sharia Law. Morsi said now that the new constitution is in place, he can focus on fixing Egypt's internal problems. But others say it will only exacerbate internal divisions and transform Egypt into a pariah state on par with the Islamic Republic of Iran. While Morsi claims the new constitution contains rights and protections for all Egyptians, its vagueness in certain areas and overt Islamic flavor has lead many to fear that radical Muslim clerics are going to play an increasingly influential role in Egypt, while minority groups and women will suffer. "It's a disaster," female Egyptian lawyer Nihad Abu El Konsam told German media. "There isn't a single article in the draft constitution that mentions the rights of women." "This constitution will set Egypt 100 years back," added Abu El Konsam, noting that the Muslim Brotherhood had purposely left "open doors" that will result in Egyptians being placed under an extremist form of Islamic rule. Hamdeen Sabahi, an opposition leader who placed third in Egypt's presidential election, said the Muslim Brotherhood and other Islamists have "stolen" Egypt's pro-democracy revolution, but he remains hopeful that they can be toppled. In the meantime, "Morsi may have been elected democratically, but he is not governing democratically," charged Sabahi in an interview with the Associated Press. Evidence of that was seen in Morsi's reaction to ongoing opposition to his new constitution even after it passed the referendum. The president issued a thinly-veiled warning that public demonstrations against his rule must end, because the people were tired of it. Morsi tried to accuse all who oppose him of being responsible for the nation's continuing economic woes, a tried and true tactic used by all of recent history's most successful despots. The threats seemed to be working. While the run-up to the referendum saw hundreds of thousands protesting daily in central Cairo and even marching on the presidential palace, now that it has been signed into law very few are taking to the streets. As for the European Union: the Task Force, co-chaired by EU High Representative Catherine Ashton and Egyptian Foreign Minister Kamel Amr declared: "In support of the ongoing democratic transformation, Egypt and the EU will work together to overcome the socio-economic challenges, thus setting an example for the region and beyond." Catherine Ashton said she was delighted with the results of the Task Force: "The past two days confirm the EU as Egypt's main partner in its historic transition. The Task Force is a new type of European diplomacy, mobilising all EU assets and working with both the public and private sectors." The European Union committed also to provide additional financial support to Egypt worth nearly EUR800 million for 2012-2013 (EUR303 million in grants and EUR450 million in loans). This is on top of the EUR449 million already provided for the period 2011-13. The European Investment Bank announced potential lending of up to EUR1.7 billion for 2012-13, and a new Task Force fund, which can provide funds of up to EUR60 million for countries in transition. The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development confirmed the start of operations in Egypt and announced plans for lending of up to EUR1 billion per year http://www.liveleak.com/view?i=e6f_1368823944 english-patriot33 EU donates EUR 5 billion to islamic fundamentalist regime in Egypt islam, muslims, e.u, madness, ukip, Fri, 17 May 2013 16:32:10 -0400 http://www.liveleak.com/view?i=8d4_1368822371 english-patriot33 http://www.barenakedislam.com/2013/05/17/15-palestinian-muslims-with-ties-to-terroror-group-hamas-arrested-on-charges-of-running-a-multi-million-dollar-cigarette-smuggling-ring-in-new-york/ http://news.yahoo.com/york-says-breaks-cigarette-smuggling-ring-linked-militants-003952926.html 15 Palestinian MUSLIMS with ties to terroror group Hamas, arrested on charges of running a multi-million-dollar cigarette smuggling ring in New York "We don't know where all of that money went, but what we do know is deeply troubling," Schneiderman said. "We know that some members of this group have ties to very dangerous people, we know they were arrested with weapons, we know that they made tens of millions of dollars but so far we have found only a fraction of that." Investigators are still tracking where much of the money ended up, but they noted similar rings in the past have funneled money to Hamas, the Islamist government in Gaza, and Hezbollah, the militant Shi'ite group based in Lebanon, both of which are considered to be terrorist organizations by the United States. The traffickers had alleged links to known terrorists, including Omar Abdel-Rahman, the blind cleric serving a life sentence for a conspiracy to blow up New York City landmarks. That combination has raised concerns about where the money went. "We know they made tens of millions of dollars but so far we've only found a fraction of that," state Attorney General Eric T. Schneiderman said while announcing enterprise corruption and other charges against 16 people, all Palestinian MUSLIM immigrants. In a 224-count indictment, the men are charged with enterprise corruption, money laundering and other tax crimes, for which each defendant faces up to 25 years in prison if convicted. In addition to costing New York State and New York City an estimated $80 million in lost sales tax revenue, the ring generated at least $10 million in profit, Schneiderman and Kelly said. Authorities said the ring was headed by two brothers, Basel Ramadan, 42, and Samir Ramadan, 40, both of Ocean City, Maryland, who ran a couple of local Subway restaurant franchises. Investigators said they found $1.4 million stashed in Basel Ramadan's home, some of it stuffed in black plastic trash bags, and three handguns following his arrest on Thursday. http://www.liveleak.com/view?i=8d4_1368822371 english-patriot33 15 Palestinian MUSLIMS with ties to terroror group Hamas, arrested on charges of running a multi-million-dollar cigarette smuggling ring in New York islam, muslims, jihad, terrorists, pedophiles, outlaw islam, Fri, 17 May 2013 12:59:31 -0400 http://www.liveleak.com/view?i=5a6_1368809412 th1sf8te President Obama humiliated the marine who he asked to hold his umbrella by making him 'look like a butler', a respected military general claimed today. Thomas McInerney, a former United States Air Force Lieutenant General, said that the President showed a 'lack of respect' by making the soldier shelter him from a shower. He also said that the President has plenty of aides so did not understand why one of them could not have held the umbrella. The President caused a stir when he summoned over two marines to keep him dry at a press conference in the Rose Garden. The marines held an umbrella over the President and the Turkish Prime Minister individually as Obama made jokes about the weather. However, for some the move was not a laughing matter particularly as it is a breach of protocol for marines to hold umbrellas while in uniform. Lt Gen McInerney told MailOnline that he found it particularly insulting how the President at one point his his hand under the marine's arm 'like he wasn't doing a good job or something'. He said: 'The President has stood in the rain before without an umbrella and a marine would generally stand there without holding an umbrella.' 'He isn't some kind of butler or something. 'It makes the other guy (the other marine) look like a butler too.' 'I think it's a lack of respect for the marine, that's what I think.' 'I don't understand why one of his aides could not have held the umbrella. The marine is a warrior but the aides are not.' Lt Gen McInerney, 76, served in Vietnam and fought with NATO and was commander of the 11th Air Force in Alaska before retiring. He said: 'If I was his (the marine's) commander...I'd say good job, you did what he wanted you to do but you can't, really he has to keep his comments to himself because if you say anything you're going to get in trouble.' 'Any time a marine has said something...one general who spoke out, he got fired, he got canned from his job.' Lt Gen McInerney also lashed out at the President for not doing enough to support soldiers when they return home from combat.' He said: 'The President talks a good line but he doesn't follow a good line. These guys are coming home and they're not getting what they are supposed to get.' 'The guy's (Obama) got to get real and he's got to start doing stuff the right way and answering questions in the right manner, not changing subject in the middle of the interview.' According to Marine Corps regulations, not even the President of the United States can request a Marine to carry an umbrella without the express permission of the Commandant of the Marine Corps. The Marine Corp Manual, which is the bible for all soldiers serving, specifically states that a soldier's uniform dress code does not allow the carrying of an umbrella and 'no officer or official shall issue instructions which conflict with, alter, or amend any provision without the approval of the Commandant of the Marine Corps.' Indeed, male Marines are informed never to carry an umbrella from the earliest phases of training. Regulation MCO P1020.34F of the Marine Corps Uniform Regulations chapter 3, rules out any use or carrying of an umbrella while a Marine is in uniform. However, female Marines 'may carry an all-black, plain standard or collapsible umbrella at their option during inclement weather with the service and dress uniforms. It will be carried in the left hand so that the hand salute can be properly rendered.' Many commentators found the use of the marines to be particularly insensitive, given the President was answering questions on Benghazi. The lack of marines protecting Ambassador Chris Stevens at the Libyan consulate and the failure to deploy marines to protect him amid the outbreak of violence has come under fire ever since last year's attack on September 11. Usually a marine guard would be in force at an overseas diplomatic compound but in Benghazi the government opted to use a private Libyan security team. Stevens had made repeated appeals for improved security at the Libyan base but to no avail. Tyrone S. Woods and Glen Doherty were part of a CIA security team stationed a mile away who heard gunshots and intervened to try and help Stevens. They were also killed in an attack on their compound. When violence broke out there were also delays sending in marines to assist. A rapid response team were twice told to stand down amid the chaos while reports at the time said the Fleet Antiterrorism Security Team was delayed because the state department ordered them to deplane and change into civilian clothing. Answering questions on Benghazi, President Obama said the government was ' continuing to review our security at high-threat diplomatic posts' in light of the attack. At the press conference originally intended to be a victory lap for the United States' relationship with Turkey, Obama stood alongside Turkish Prime Minister Recep Erdogan and fielded questions which quickly shifted to the trio of scandals that are engulfing his administration. He also dodged questions about the IRS's targeting of conservative groups, and said 'I offer no apologies' for the Department of Justice's secret seizure of reporter's phone records in search of a classified intelligence leak. He has been under growing pressure over these issues and Benghazi in recent weeks. It has emerged that his State Department political appointees intervened in the aftermath of the 2012 terror attack, in a process that resulted in a misleading set of talking points which ignored terrorism in favor of a more muted explanation, in the midst of a re-election campaign. Addressing the Benghazi fallout pre-emptively before Erdogan spoke, Obama said that 'at my direction, we've been taking a series of steps that were recommended by the review board.' He spoke of various measures he was recommending, to 'learn the lessons of Benghazi.' But he referred to the murders of four Americans there as an 'incident,' not a terror attack. He said: 'That's why, at my direction, we've been taking a series of steps that were recommended by the review board after the incident. We're continuing to review our security at high-threat diplomatic posts, including the size and nature of our presence; improving training for those headed to dangerous posts; increasing intelligence and warning capabilities.' 'And I've directed the Defense Department to ensure that our military can respond lightning quick in times of crisis.' And his remarks focused on 'properly funding' the State Department and Pentagon-run security at diplomatic posts, shifting the burden to Congress to 'provide resources and new authorities so that we can implement all the recommendations of the Accountability Review Board which issued a report last month'. He said: 'We're going to need Congress's help in terms of increasing the number of our Marine Corps Guard who protect our embassies. 'We're not going to be able to do this alone,' Obama said. 'We need Congress.' The review board is under fire for failing to interview high-level Obama administration figures, including then-Secretary of State Hillary Clinton. Interviewing Clinton, Republicans on Capitol Hill have said, would have provided insights into who was accountable for lapses in security that left the U.S. Consulate in Benghazi, Libya vulnerable to attack. But despite Obama's plea for more funding, money was not an issue in the months before the Benghazi attack when consular officials in Libya asked the State Department for more security forces. Those requests were repeatedly denied, and neither Hillary Clinton nor other State Department officials have raised a lack of funding as the reason more special forces were not on the scene. On the night of the Benghazi attack, the State Department refused to authorize an existing special forces team in the Libyan capital city of Tripoli to board a military C-130 plane headed to Benghazi, despite their readiness to intervene. The Obama administration said later that the decision was made because the forces would not have arrived at the consulate, which was under attack, in time to make a difference. The State Department has been silent on the question of how it knew how long the armed, military-style assault from Islamist terror groups would last. Obama addressed the need to for ''increasing intelligence and warning capabilities' at 'diplomatic posts around the world,' and asked Congress for money to 'increase the Marine Corps contingents' at State Department facilities. On the IRS scandal, Obama said he knew nothing of what was going on. 'My main concern is fixing a problem,' Obama said. 'It is just simply unacceptable for there to be even a hint of partisanship' in the IRS Obuma needs a slap Read more: http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2325893/President-Obama-makes-U-S-Marine-break-rules-does-look-happy-it.html#ixzz2TZNFD7F1 Follow us: @MailOnline on Twitter DailyMail on Facebook Video from CNN http://www.liveleak.com/view?i=5a6_1368809412 th1sf8te 'It made him look like a butler': Retired general blasts President Obama for ordering U.S. Marine to break military rules by holding an umbrella Retired general blasts President Obama for ordering U.S. Marine to break military rules by holding an umbrella Fri, 17 May 2013 10:31:46 -0400 http://www.liveleak.com/view?i=a0c_1368800021 m16carbine How Qatar seized control of the Syrian revolution By Roula Khalaf and Abigail Fielding-Smith As the Arab world's bloodiest conflict grinds on, Qatar has emerged as a driving force: pouring in tens of millions of dollars to arm the rebels. Yet it also stands accused of dividing them - and of positioning itself for even greater influence in the post-Assad era. FT investigation by Roula Khalaf and Abigail Fielding-Smith A short drive from the rising skyscrapers of Doha's West Bay, emblems of the once-sleepy Qatari capital's frenetic growth, the three-starred flag of the Syrian revolution can be seen fluttering over a modern villa guarded by police cars. The villa is the new Syrian Arab Republic embassy in Qatar , representing not the regime of Bashar al-Assad , but opponents fighting for his removal. It is the only such embassy in the world, inaugurated by a Qatari minister two months ago with the usual diplomatic pomp, after hard lobbying by Qatar led the 22-member Arab League to hand over Syria's seat to the opposition. The diplomats working inside have recourse to neither a government nor a bureaucracy to serve Syrians abroad, lacking even the means to renew a passport. "Maybe soon," mutters a hopeful junior diplomat. But Qatar is not a country that allows details to get in the way of ambition. The opening of the embassy was a theatrical expression of this small, massively rich country's single-minded lurch into Syria's crisis . When it comes to backing Syria's rebels, no one can claim more credit than the gas-rich Gulf state. Whether in terms of armaments or financial support for dissidents, diplomatic manoeuvring or lobbying, Qatar has been in the lead, readily disgorging its gas-generated wealth in the pursuit of the downfall of Assad. Yet, as the Arab world's bloodiest uprising grinds on into its third year, Qatar finds itself pulled into a complicated and fractured conflict, the outcome of which has a decreasing ability to influence, while simultaneously becoming a high-profile scapegoat for participants on both sides. Among the Syrian regime's numerous but fragmented opponents the small Gulf state evokes a surprisingly ambivalent - and often overtly hostile - response. In the shell-blasted areas of rebel-held Syria, few appear to be aware of the vast sums that Qatar has contributed - estimated by rebel and diplomatic sources to be about $1bn, but put by people close to the Qatar government at as much as $3bn. However, a perception is taking root among growing numbers of Syrians that Qatar is using its financial muscle to develop networks of loyalty among rebels and set the stage for influence in a post-Assad era. "Qatar has a lot of money and buys everything with money, and it can put its fingerprints on it," says a rebel officer from the northern province of Idlib interviewed by the FT. Khalid al-Attiyah, Qatar's minister of state for foreign affairs, and the point man on Syria, dismisses this criticism as nothing more than noise. "We're a state, we're mature ... If we were concerned about what people say, we wouldn't be here today and Qatar wouldn't be as prosperous." But Qatar's role in Syria seems uncharacteristically prominent for a country that lacks the diplomatic experience and traditional heavyweight status of a more discreet Saudi Arabia. To some extent, the fact that Qatar is so exposed reflects the reluctance of western governments to intervene in Syria. However, for Qatar, Syria is also the culmination of an opportunistic foreign policy which saw Doha become the unlikely backer of other Arab revolts in north Africa - and a friend of those who emerge as winners, in most cases Islamists. Qatar's ruling family, the al-Thanis, have no ideological or religious affinity with the Islamists - they are simply not choosy about the beliefs held by useful friends. Qatar has supported the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and Tunisia's Islamist al-Nahda party, which won the first elections after the popular revolts. Some politicians in the region believe the emir is trying to position himself as the "Islamist Abdel Nasser", as one Arab politician put it, referring to the late Egyptian president and the Arab world's only true pan-Arab leader. Most of Doha's neighbours in the Gulf are hostile to the Islamist trend in the region, but this is of little consequence to a state that takes pleasure in being contrarian. Nor are the al-Thanis embarrassed by the contradictions of an autocracy cheerleading for revolution. "The Qataris say if there's a tsunami coming your way you ride it, not let it hit you," says a western diplomat describing Qatar's attitude towards Islamists. It is this kind of dynamism and risk-taking at an executive level that has enabled Doha to act as a regional power only a few years after being a diplomatic nobody. But the military stalemate of the Syrian uprising, in which more than 70,000 people have died, has also revealed the recklessness and political impotence that ultimately undermine Qatar's objectives. "The Qataris are overextended - their system runs on a few people at the top, and there isn't much in terms of a bureaucracy," comments another diplomat. In the case of Syria, those key players have been the emir, Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa al-Thani, his son and crown prince, Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad, the prime minister Sheikh Hamad bin Jassim, plus Attiyah, the minister for foreign affairs. As the Qataris have attempted to unite the political opposition by championing the formation of the Syrian National Coalition (the main front) they have been accused of dividing it - just as their efforts to shape a fragmented rebel army into a more coherent form by helping to unify the brigades under one command have contributed to its incoherence. Not all of the criticism is fair. Partly it is driven by the irritation of many Arabs, at both state and street level, with what they see as an ambitious, nouveau riche state overreaching itself. "You can criticise them for hijacking the opposition but who else is helping?" acknowledges an independent-minded Syrian opposition member who, like many others in the region who were interviewed for this article, requested anonymity. But the disapproval levelled at Qatar is pervasive. A senior rebel commander who has dealt with the Qataris suggests that Doha should look long and hard at why its role has also sparked so much animosity. "After two years it is time for everyone involved in Syria to review their actions and engage in self-correction," he says. . . . For Sheikh Hamad, the 61-year-old emir who has ruled Qatar since 1995 after deposing his father, the road to Damascus has involved a spectacular U-turn. It wasn't long ago that Bashar al-Assad and his wife Asma were regular visitors to Doha, as guests of the emir and his second wife, Sheikha Moza. Qatari institutions were big investors in Syria, with a $5bn joint holding company set up in 2008 to develop everything from power stations to hotels. The emir also championed the international rehabilitation of Assad during his gradual ostracisation by the US, Europe and his Arab peers; Sheikh Hamad was instrumental in restoring Syrian relations with France in the years before the uprising, when he counted the former president Nicolas Sarkozy as a friend. Back then Syria was part of an alliance - with Iran and Lebanon's Hizbollah - that seemed on the ascendant, and Qatar, with typical pragmatism and opportunism, saw a chance to ride the wave as well as to moderate Assad's policies. When the Syrian revolt erupted in March 2011, Qatar, like Turkey, reacted cautiously; Al Jazeera, the Qatari-owned television channel, was criticised for downplaying the first protests. Behind the scenes, both the emir and crown prince Sheikh Tamim advised Assad against a military solution. But when prime minister Hamad bin Jassim went to visit Assad a month after the outbreak of protests, it became clear to Qatar that the Syrian hardman wanted "to kill people", as bin Jassim recently recalled at a Brookings Institution meeting. One person who influenced the emir's thinking at the time is Azmi Bishara , a prominent former Arab Israeli MP, exiled in Qatar (like many other Arab dissidents) after the Israeli government accused him of passing information to the Lebanese group Hizbollah during Israel's onslaught on Lebanon in 2006 - a charge Bishara denies. An adviser to the emir and the crown prince, Bishara has become something of a court intellectual in Doha. He is said to have been involved in the formation of the Syrian National Coalition, now the main opposition umbrella group, and to have been used to "test" opposition figures. He, too, had known Bashar al-Assad well, but then became an avid enthusiast of Arab revolts and the people's thirst for democracy. Writing in July 2011, Bishara said that Assad could have stayed in power had he led the reforms that people wanted: "The regime chose not to change, and so the people will change it." (Bishara was not available for comment.) Although the emir did not make his position public until Saudi Arabia broke its silence over Syria in August 2011, the conviction took hold in Qatar throughout that bloody first summer that Syria's was as much a revolution as anywhere else in the region. Following the pattern of the other Arab uprisings, Qatar's instinct was to bet on the opposition. In January 2012, the emir told a US television network that Arab troops should be sent to Syria "to stop the killings". Doha's leaders were particularly emboldened by the revolt in Libya, where Qatar had played the lead Arab role in the Nato-led intervention. Although they knew that Assad's downfall would not be as easy as Muammer Gaddafi's, they expected western partners would eventually step in on the side of the opposition. One senior Qatari official suggested in late 2012 that Syria would go the way of Libya, but over a much longer term. Assad's removal, after all, served the strategic purpose of weakening Iran, his closest regional ally. So far at least, this gamble has proved a miscalculation. "We didn't want to take the lead. We begged a lot of countries to start to take the lead and we'll be in the back seat. But we find ourselves in the front seat," lamented prime minister bin Jassim recently. Even within the Arab world, Qatar found much stronger resistance to action than was the case with Libya. "Before we get disappointed by the west, we should ask ourselves as an Arab nation what we've done - it is an Arab issue in the first place," says Attiyah, the minister for foreign affairs. In the years before the Arab uprisings, Qatar had cultivated its role as a mediator, capable of talking to all sides on the divisions that polarised the Middle East. It hosted the US's biggest military air base in the region, while maintaining cordial relations with Iran; it held contacts with Israel while simultaneously backing the Palestinian group Hamas and Lebanon's Hizbollah. On Syria, Qatar soon emerged as one of the few angry voices at Arab summits, pushing for a tougher line. "In Syria, Qatar became an active protagonist," says a western diplomat. Having worked to become a kind of Norway of the Gulf, he adds, it also wanted to be "the Gulf version of the UK and France, and you can't be both at the same time". . . . Ahfad al-Rasoul is a source of envy among other brigades fighting in Syria. A relatively new player put together from several fighting groups, it is often linked to the gas riches of Qatar. Ahfad al-Rasoul is one of the few fighting coalitions in Syria that can be considered "effective", boasts Khaled, a smartly dressed, laptop-carrying "liaison" officer for the group, interviewed by the FT in southern Turkey, near the Syrian border. Not so, says Abu Samer, a commander from a rival group, who complains about shortages of weapons and ammunition. "If I was getting 15 per cent of what they're getting, I'd do a lot," he grumbles. Though Khaled insists his battalion's good fortunes are thanks to a mix of funding sources, others such as Abu Samer see the hand of Qatar at work. Supporting the armed rebellion was the inevitable next stage of Qatar's deepening involvement in Syria. By early 2012, as peaceful protests gave way to an armed opposition, Qatar was scouring around for light weaponry, buying arms in Libya and in eastern European states, and flying them to Turkey, where intelligence services helped deliver them across the border. At first, say people with direct knowledge of the arms shipments, Qatar worked through Turkish intelligence to identify recipients, and then, as Saudi Arabia joined the covert military effort, through Lebanese mediators. The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, which tracks arms transfers, says that between April 2012 and March this year, more than 70 military cargo flights from Qatar landed in Turkey. Elizabeth O'Bagy, an analyst at the US Institute for the Study of War, which has published extensive studies of Syria's fragmented rebel movement, says that as the conflict progressed, the Qataris worked through members of the exiled Muslim Brotherhood to identify rebel factions that should be supported. For example, she says, that is how they linked up with the Farouq brigades, one of the largest and more mainstream factions. Meanwhile, opposition sources say the Qataris have also sent their own special forces to find insurgent groups, and people involved in the weapons business say a Qatari general has been the point man on arms deliveries, travelling to the "operations" room that was set up first in Istanbul and then in Ankara. However, it is difficult to point to rebel brigades that are exclusively Qatari-funded or backed. Ahfad al-Rasoul, for example, is also thought to be receiving support from Saudi Arabia. Equally, the erratic and limited nature of weapons shipments means that even recipients of Qatari support are not always aware of Doha's role. Mahmoud Marrouch, a young fighter from Liwaa al-Tawhid, the rural Aleppo group that is believed to have been a major recipient of Qatari arms, says Qatar is like the rest of the world - promising weapons but not delivering. What the fighters have, he says, was seized from regime bases, or purchased on the black market. "The Qataris and the Saudis need a green light from America to help us," he adds. A rebel leader in the northern Aleppo province, who works with Liwaa al-Tawhid, says he has also received a Saudi intermediary who goes around rebel-held areas distributing funds. "Groups get funding from both Qatar and Saudi Arabia and they deceive sponsors sometimes," comments O'Bagy. Indeed, if Qatar is, as its detractors say, seeking to build up a proxy force in Syria to implement its regional agenda, it is doing so in an environment which is not conducive to either loyalty or cohesion. With so many different outside sources of sponsorship and no stable organisational structures, rebel groups lurch from alliance to alliance and continually rebrand themselves in the search for support. Ironically, although the relationship between Riyadh and Doha has long been characterised by mutual suspicion, in many ways they have worked very closely on Syria. However, a crucial division over the Muslim Brotherhood has undoubtedly led to the pursuit of divergent agendas on the Syrian battlefield, with harmful consequences for an opposition in desperate need of unity. For the Saudis, the handful of secular rebel factions, plus the Salafi groups that espouse a stricter Wahabi Islam practised in Saudi Arabia, are vastly preferable to the Brotherhood, a more organised political group and therefore a greater political threat. "The Saudis say 'No to the Brotherhood,'" says Riad al-Shaqfa, the leader of the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood. Qataris, on the other hand, are "playing a positive role", though Shaqfa insists that his group's funding is from its own members, not from Doha. Khalid al-Attiyah denies any tensions with Saudi Arabia, saying co-operation is much closer than people assume, with daily consultations. However, rebel sources and analysts say that by September last year, the rivalry had intensified to the point where the Qataris and Saudis were creating separate military alliances and structures. As complaints poured in from opposition leaders and western officials, the two states agreed to bring the structures together under the supreme military command, headed by the western-backed general Selim Idriss . However, commanders who work with Idriss say that neither country is following through with its promise to bolster the supreme military command, instead continuing to work independently. One reason could be that the Gulf states worry that their limited supplies would be distributed too broadly by the supreme command, instead of reaching only the most effective factions. But the behaviour has bred resentment. "Qatar and Saudi Arabia ... are playing out their rivalries here, they are dividing people," says Abdul Jabbar Akaidi, the head of the Aleppo revolutionary military council. Speaking from one of his bases on the Syrian side of the border with Turkey, he adds: "People will remember those who gave without having an agenda. The Syrians are clever, they know when there is an agenda." . . . By late 2012 a new factor was emerging in Syria, one that had the potential to complicate Qatar's relationship with the west. The extremist group Jabhat al-Nusrah was gaining ground, playing a prominent role in dislodging the regime from military facilities in northern Syria. In December, the US felt sufficiently alarmed to add Nusrah to its global terrorist list. Concerned that Qatar's level of tolerance for radical Islamists was higher than theirs, western governments also wanted safeguards in place to ensure that weapons did not end up in the hands of jihadi groups like Nusrah. The problem, says one former senior US official, was that "the Qataris felt it didn't matter who you give to, what's important is to bring down Bashar." According to him, the objective in Washington became "to keep the Qataris from doing whatever they want". So the US instituted a "consultative process". Two "operations" rooms that oversee weapons deliveries were set up, one in Turkey, the other, more recently, in Jordan. They include representatives from nearly a dozen countries. The Qataris, says the former US official, were co-operative. Yet allegations that the Qataris have - directly or indirectly - helped Jabhat al-Nusrah have not gone away. At least one Arab government recently said as much, although experts on jihadi movements say the extremist group's funding comes from al-Qaeda in Iraq and from private donors in the Gulf, not from governments. Yet even with the "consultative process" in place, leakage might be inevitable, whether through the funding of rebels or through the massive charitable contributions from the Gulf that reach Syria. "Because the Free Syrian Army groups work so closely with non-FSA groups these weapons are spreading just because they are fighting side by side - and maybe the groups trade arms with each other as well," says Eliot Higgins, who examines and records weapons used in the Syrian conflict on his well-followed Brown Moses blog. Attiyah says Doha has never backed Nusrah, and blames the international community's inaction on Syria for allowing it to flourish. "Is it the Security Council's delay in taking a firm resolution against Bashar al-Assad and his regime that has made emerge? In my opinion, yes," he says. Sheikh Hamad bin Jassim, the prime minister, is even more dismissive of allegations of Qatari support for extremists, joking in his Brookings presentation that such rumours are spread by jealous neighbours to tease Qatar. Beneath the quips, however, are signs that Qatar's influence over military supplies to the rebellion may be waning, as its role in weapons deliveries takes second place to that of Saudi Arabia. Riyadh has more developed networks to source weapons and it has been working closely with Jordan to bolster rebel groups in southern Syria that are not tied to Nusrah. . . . Many Syrians have probably never heard of Mustafa Sabbagh, though he is considered the most powerful man in the political opposition. The owner of a building material and contracting company, the 48-year-old secretary-general of the National Coalition lived in Saudi Arabia for much of the past decade. He doesn't make many speeches, or issue statements, but he does oversee the coalition's budget, to which the Qataris are the biggest donors, and is responsible, as one western official says, "for writing the cheques". While seen by both friends and detractors as a shrewd man who appealed to Qatar officials' business-minded attitude, Sabbagh has come under criticism for supposedly using his position to control the opposition and further Qatari influence. Tensions between him and some of the secular members of the coalition exploded into the open recently after the controversial election of an interim prime minister, Ghassan Hitto , in March. The row over Hitto's appointment was so bitter it caused tension between Qatar and Saudi Arabia and pushed the Saudis to become more active in opposition politics, which they had largely left to the Qataris. According to pro-Saudi opposition figures, negotiations are now under way to resolve the dispute. Qatar's involvement with Syria's political opposition has generated even more controversy than its support of rebel groups. The dissidents are a fractious assortment of cliques, but they play an important role in shaping international policy. While it was Turkey that helped form the first credible opposition umbrella group, the Syrian National Council , in August 2011, Qatar quickly embraced it and contributed to its funding. The SNC, however, fell victim to infighting, which gave the Muslim Brotherhood, the only organised bloc within it, the greatest influence. As secular voices began dropping out of the SNC, western nations, led by the US, pressured the Qataris to help form a broader opposition based on an initiative proposed by Riad Seif, a well-respected Syrian dissident. The new body, the National Coalition, was announced in Doha in November 2012. It was no secret that Qatari officials were less convinced of the need to improve the SNC. Their view appeared to be that dominance of the Muslim Brotherhood was neither as great as claimed, nor an issue. A former US official who tracked the process of the creation of the coalition said dealing with the Qataris at the time was like a "war of attrition". However, claims of Qatari dominance of the opposition persisted, even after the coalition was created. True, the Muslim Brotherhood was no longer the main component, but a new bloc of more than a dozen members, brought in by Sabbagh as representatives of local communities in Syria, sparked new disagreements. It was seen as another bloc that was loyal to Qatar. Each of these members was supposed to represent a local council in Syria's different provinces, and together the councils received $8m from Qatar soon after the formation of the coalition. Qatar was also the first - and possibly the only - country to provide funding for the coalition budget, to the tune of $20m, and it delivered the first $10m out of a pledged $100m package for the organisation's new humanitarian assistance unit. In an interview with the FT, Sabbagh said that the Qatar label that has stuck to him is inaccurate and unfair. Peppering his words with praise for Saudi Arabia's contribution to the Syrian cause, he says his relationship with Qatar is confined to what he calls "logistics" support for a business forum that he founded after the revolt against Assad broke out. The forum had mobilised funds from merchants inside and outside Syria to support the Free Syrian Army. Sabbagh insists that the representatives of local councils that he invited into the coalition were an attempt, even if imperfect, to raise the representation of people inside the country in the main opposition front. "It's inevitable because there are no elections. It was an experience that needed maturing," he says. Attiyah, meanwhile, says he has no closer relationship with Sabbagh than anyone else in the coalition. He also points out that the coalition with its various components, including the local representatives, was not created by Qatar alone but with the help and blessing of Arab and western officials. . . . In Syria itself, the number of dead continues to rise and Bashar al-Assad is still stubbornly clinging on to power. Whether Qatar's venture into Syrian opposition politics will have any returns will depend on whether Syria survives as a country - something that is by no means assured. Perhaps for the Qatari emir, the demise of Assad will be sufficient satisfaction. In theory, Qatar could also emerge with multiple points of influence through Islamists and loyal brigades. But it has already created many enemies inside Syria, and not just among pro-regime supporters. So torn apart is the fabric of Syria's society, and so radicalised and suspicious its battered population, that the Qataris are more likely to find that they are neither thanked - nor even wanted - there. http://www.liveleak.com/view?i=a0c_1368800021 m16carbine How Qatar seized control of the Syrian revolution syra, syrian civil war, qatar Fri, 17 May 2013 09:06:19 -0400 http://www.liveleak.com/view?i=23b_1368795857 omniradar By Daya Gamage May 16, 2013 "Information Clearing House " -" Asian Tribune"- There is a 'side story' going on in the American media - both the electronic and print about the Islamist jihadists lethal attack on the American 'post' in Benghazi, Libya last September 11 which killed American ambassador Christopher Steven and three others; The emphasis and the debate is on why the event was twisted by the Obama administration to conceal a terrorist attack on eve of the presidential election. With the killing of Osama bin Larden on May 2 last year the administration, which was approaching the re-election of Mr. Obama in November, wants to convince the American people that the al Qaeda was now annihilated for good. When the Islamist jihadist group affiliated to al Qaeda lethally attacked the American 'post' in Benghazi the Obama administration twisted the events to convince that a anti-Islamic video produced by someone in California was the cause of the attack. These days the highlights and debate is about why the 'talking points' were changed twelve times to give that different picture. As Obama rightfully said a couple of days ago about this debate, mostly spearheaded by the Republicans, was a 'side show.' The 'real show' is in fact buried. And the 'real show' is that the United States, Ambassador Steven playing a major role, was in the process of shipping arms to Syrian rebels to topple Basher el-Assad's regime. It was on October 25 last year that FoxNews.com broke the story that a mysterious Libyan ship was reportedly carrying weapons and bound for Syrian rebels would have had some link to the September 11 terror attack on the U.S. 'post' in Benghazi. Why do we use the term 'post' in this report? Because when changes were made to the Benghazi attack story by the Obama administration it changed from 'American Consulate' to 'American Post'. The reason: Benghazi operation was entirely a CIA operation. Through shipping records, Fox News has confirmed that the Libyan-flagged vessel Al Entisar, which means "The Victory," was received in the Turkish port of Iskenderun -- 35 miles from the Syrian border -- on Sept. 6, just five days before Ambassador Chris Stevens and three other American officers were killed during an extended assault by more than 100 Islamist militants. On the night of Sept. 11, in what would become his last known public meeting, Stevens met with the Turkish Consul General Ali Sait Akin, and escorted him out of the 'posts' front gate one hour before the assault began. Although what was discussed at the meeting is not public, a source told Fox News that Stevens was in Benghazi to negotiate a weapons transfer, an effort to get SA-7 missiles out of the hands of Libya-based extremists. And although the negotiation said to have taken place may have had nothing to do with the attack on the consulate later that night or the Libyan mystery ship, it could explain why Stevens was travelling in such a volatile region on the 11th anniversary of the 9/11 attacks. When asked to comment, a State Department spokeswoman dismissed the idea, saying Stevens was there for diplomatic meetings, and to attend the opening of a cultural center. According to an initial Sept. 14 report by the Times of London, Al Entisar was carrying 400 tons of cargo. Some of it was humanitarian, but also reportedly weapons, described by the report as the largest consignment of weapons headed for Syria's rebels on the frontlines. The cargo reportedly included surface-to-air anti-aircraft missiles, RPG's and Russian-designed shoulder-launched missiles known as MANPADS. In March 2011 Stevens became the official U.S. liaison to the al-Qaeda-linked Libyan opposition, working directly with Abdelhakim Belhadj of the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group-a group that has now disbanded, with some fighters reportedly participating in the attack that took Stevens' life. In November 2011 The Telegraph reported that Belhadj, acting as head of the Tripoli Military Council, "met with Free Syrian Army leaders in Istanbul and on the border with Turkey" in an effort by the new Libyan government to provide money and weapons to the growing insurgency in Syria. The Internet Media reported at that time that Ambassador Stevens had only one person-Belhadj-between himself and the Benghazi man who brought heavy weapons to Syria. The Asian Tribune has also found that the Internet Media further reported that if the new Libyan government was sending seasoned Islamic fighters and 400 tons of heavy weapons to Syria through a port in southern Turkey-a deal brokered by Stevens' primary Libyan contact during the Libyan revolution-then the governments of Turkey and the U.S. surely knew about it. Furthermore there was a CIA post in Benghazi, located 1.2 miles from the U.S. consulate, used as "a base for, among other things, collecting information on the proliferation of weaponry looted from Libyan government arsenals, including surface-to-air missiles" ... and that its security features "were more advanced than those at rented villa where Stevens died." As noted earlier, the Obama administration has since described the American facility in Benghazi not as a 'Consulate' but as a 'Post'. The U.S. Republican Senator Rand Paul, who is expected to run for his party presidential nomination in the year 2016, was the only American lawmaker who disclosed about this 'arms deal' which he connects to Ambassador Steven's brutal muder in the hands of the Islamist Jihadists. In an interview aired on CNN May 9 evening, Sen. Paul said he hasn't ruled out the possibility that last year's attack unfolded as a result of a secret arms trade. The confusion in the immediate aftermath of the event - including unfounded admissions from America's United Nations envoy Susan Rice that contradicted what is known today about the attack - could actually be a cover-up, the senator said. The Obama administration sent its ambassador to UN Susan Rice on the following Sunday talk shows to say that the offending Islamic video was the cause of the attack in Benghazi. "I've actually always suspected that, although I have no evidence, that maybe we were facilitating arms leaving Libya going through Turkey into Syria," he said. "Were they trying to obscure that there was an arms operation going on at the CIA annex?" Paul asked. "I'm not sure exactly what was going on, but I think questions ought to be asked and answered, and I'm a little curious when employees of the State Department are told by government officials they shouldn't testify - before the Senate or House committees - and then they are sort of sequestered and kept away from testimony, so I think there may be more to this." This is not the first time either that Senator Paul raised questions about possible arms supplies under the CIA umbrella. During her testimony in the Senate in January, Rand Paul asked then-Secretary of State Hillary Clinton whether the spy agency was sending weapons from Benghazi into other countries. Clinton replied that he would have to ask CIA officials about it. Sen. Rand Paul said on Aaron Klein Radio in mid April: "First of all with regard to Benghazi, I think it's important because it may have something to do with why the compound was attacked. If we were involved with shipping guns to Turkey, there was a report that a ship left from Libya towards Turkey and that there were arms on it in the week preceding this ; there were reports that our ambassador was meeting with the Turkish attach'e, so I think with regards to figuring out what happened at Benghazi, it's very important to know whether or not the CIA annex had anything to do with facilitating guns being sent to Turkey and ultimately to Syria. With regard to arming the rebels, just this week in the armed services committee, General Dempsey, the Joint Chiefs of Staff said that we were no longer able to distinguish who the good guys were from the bad guys and that sounds pretty worrisome if we are actually arming people who in the end may be enemies of America...enemies of Israel... enemies maybe of the Christians who live within Syria...sending arms to a rebel force to that may include Al-Nusra and other radical jihadists." In the eighties, the Iran-Contra Arms Affair shook the Regan administration the way the Benghazi affair is developing to shake the foundation of the Obama administration. Iran-contra affair, in U.S. history, secret arrangement in the 1980s to provide funds to the Nicaraguan contra rebels from profits gained by selling arms to Iran. The Iran-contra affair was the product of two separate initiatives during the administration of President Ronald Reagan. The first was a commitment to aid the contras who were conducting a guerrilla war against the leftist Sandinista government of Nicaragua. The second was to placate "moderates" within the Iranian government in order to secure the release of American hostages held by pro-Iranian groups in Lebanon and to influence Iranian foreign policy in a pro-Western direction. Despite the strong opposition of the Reagan administration, the Democratic-controlled Congress enacted legislation that prohibited the Defense Dept., the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), or any other government agency from providing military aid to the contras from Dec., 1983, to Sept., 1985. The Reagan administration circumvented these limitations by using the National Security Council (NSC), which was not explicitly covered by the law, to supervise covert military aid to the contras. Under Robert McFarlane (1983-85) and John Poindexter (1985-86) the NSC raised private and foreign funds for the contras. This operation was directed by NSC staffer Marine Lt. Col. Oliver North. McFarlane and North were also the central figures in the plan to secretly ship arms to Iran despite a U.S. trade and arms embargo. In early Nov., 1986, the scandal broke when reports in Lebanese newspapers forced the Reagan administration to disclose the arms deals. Poindexter resigned before the end of the month; North was fired. Select congressional committees held joint hearings, and in Dec., 1986, Lawrence E. Walsh was named as special prosecutor to investigate the affair. Higher administration officials, particularly Reagan, Vice President Bush, and William J. Casey (former director of the CIA, who died in May, 1987), were implicated in some testimony, but the extent of their involvement remained unclear. North said he believed Reagan was largely aware of the secret arrangement, and the independent prosecutor's report (1994) said that Reagan and Bush had some knowledge of the affair or its cover-up. Reagan and Bush both claimed to have been uninformed about the details of the affair, and no evidence was found to link them to any crime. A presidential commission was critical of the NSC, while congressional hearings uncovered a web of official deception, mismanagement, and illegality. A number of criminal convictions resulted, including those of McFarlane, North, and Poindexter, but North's and Poindexter's were vacated on appeal because of immunity agreements with the Senate concerning their testimony. Former State Dept. and CIA officials pleaded guilty in 1991 to withholding information about the contra aid from Congress, and Caspar Weinberger, defense secretary under Reagan, was charged (1992) with the same offense. In 1992 then-president Bush pardoned Weinberger and other officials who had been indicted or convicted for withholding information on or obstructing investigation of the affair. Will the Benghazi Affair leads that far? http://www.liveleak.com/view?i=23b_1368795857 omniradar The real Benghazi story US Smuggling Weapons to Syrian Rebels Sun, 12 May 2013 16:41:19 -0400 http://www.liveleak.com/view?i=c35_1368390595 IronicName Many islamist lay dead in the streets of Dhaka. News story: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-22423815 http://www.liveleak.com/view?i=c35_1368390595 IronicName Dhaka <span class="highlight">Islamist</span> Riots Dhaka,Islamists,Bangladesh,Riots Fri, 17 May 2013 04:31:47 -0400 http://www.liveleak.com/view?i=51b_1368779366 omniradar Iraq Then, Syria Now? New York Times, sarin and skepticism By FAIR May 16, 2013 "Information Clearing House " -" FAIR "- During the run-up to the Iraq War, the New York Times amplified erroneous official claims about weapons of mass destruction (FAIR Action Alert, 9/8/06). Looking at the paper's coverage of allegations of chemical weapons use by Syria, some of the same patterns are clear: an over-reliance on official sources and the downplaying of critical or skeptical analysis of the available intelligence. In "Syria Faces New Claim on Chemical Arms" ( 4/19/13 ), the paper told readers that, according to anonymous diplomats, Britain and France had sent letters to the United Nations about "credible evidence" against Syria regarding chemical weapon use. On April 24, the Times reported that Israel had "evidence that the Syrian government repeatedly used chemical weapons last month." The next day ( 4/25/13 ), the Times reported that, according to an unnamed "senior official," the White House "shares the suspicions of several of its allies that the Syrian government has used chemical weapons." The article spoke of the "mounting pressure to act against Syria," adding, "Some analysts say they worry that if the United States waits too long, it will embolden President Bashar al-Assad." And then on April 26, under the headline "White House Says Syria Has Used Chemical Arms," the Times reported: The White House, in a letter to Congressional leaders, said the nation's intelligence agencies assessed ''with varying degrees of confidence'' that the government of President Bashar al-Assad had used the chemical agent sarin on a small scale. The story included a source, Sen. Dianne Feinstein (D.-Calif.), who presented the intelligence as more definitive: She "said the agencies actually expressed more certainty about the use of these weapons than the White House indicated in its letter." An April 27 Times report warned that there were dangers in waiting too long to respond to the charges that Syria has used chemical weapons: If the president waits for courtroom levels of proof, what has been a few dozen deaths from chemical weapons--in a war that has claimed more than 70,000 lives--could multiply. In following days, the accusations of chemical weapons use were presented uncritically as the premise for political stories: pondering how the White House would "respond to growing evidence that Syrian officials have used chemical weapons" ( 4/28/13 ) or noting Republican attacks on the White House following "revelations last week that the Syrian president, Bashar al-Assad, is believed to have used chemical weapons against his own people" ( 4/29/13 ). On May 5, the Times was again weighing in on the political ramifications: Confronted with evidence that chemical weapons have been used in Syria, President Obama now finds himself in a geopolitical box, his credibility at stake with frustratingly few good options. Then, on May 5 came an unusual shift: Carla Del Ponte, a member of a United Nations team investigating human rights abuses in the Syrian civil war, claimed that the UN had collected evidence that chemical weapons had been used in Syria--but by the rebels, not by the government. After running a Reuters dispatch on May 6, the Times published its own piece on May 7, a report that talked about "new questions about the use of chemical weapons." But the emphasis was clearly on rebutting the charges: The paper reported that the White House had "cast doubt on an assertion by a United Nations official that the Syrian rebels...had used the nerve agent sarin." The piece included three U.S. sources--one named, two unnamed--who questioned the Del Ponte claims. The article went on to reiterate that the White House was weighing other options based on "its conclusion that there was a strong likelihood that the Assad government has used chemical weapons on its citizens." Outside the New York Times, though, doubts about the evidence pointing to Syrian use of poison gas were evident from the very start. McClatchy's Jonathan Landay ( 4/26/13 ) reported that one source characterized the U.S. intelligence as "tiny little data points" that were of "low to moderate" confidence. An April 30 report from GlobalPost noted that a "spent canister" at the scene of one attack "and the symptoms displayed by the victims are inconsistent with a chemical weapon such as sarin gas." A subsequent GlobalPost dispatch ( 5/5/13 ) reported that blood samples tested in Turkey were not turning up evidence of sarin exposure. NBC reporter Richard Engel (5/8/13) traveled to Syria with rebel forces to examine evidence they had collected. He seemed to concur with the GlobalPost reports that the chemical exposure could very well have been from a type of tear gas. By May 7, McClatchy was reporting that the case was looking weaker, noting that no concrete proof has emerged, and some headline-grabbing claims have been discredited or contested. Officials worldwide now admit that no allegations rise to the level of certainty.....Existing evidence casts more doubt on claims of chemical weapons use than it does to help build a case that one or both sides of the conflict have employed them. It is clear that the Times has promoted a storyline that treats the chemical weapons claims as more definitive than they are, and has given scant attention to subsequent revelations about the evidence. In a recent column ( 5/5/13 ), Times public editor Margaret Sullivan argued that the paper still faces problems with its credibility based on its reporting about Iraq's weapons of mass destruction over 10 years ago. The Times "pledged more skeptical and rigorous reporting" going forward, and Sullivan argues that the Times "has taken important steps" in that direction. But does the paper's handling of the Syria chemical weapons stories demonstrate that the paper has learned lessons? Or is it repeating the same mistakes? http://www.liveleak.com/view?i=51b_1368779366 omniradar Iraq Then, Syria Now? New York Times, sarin and skepticism Western Meddling In The Middle East ! Fri, 17 May 2013 00:47:03 -0400 http://www.liveleak.com/view?i=3dd_1368765251 ObamaroidsRx The Philippines is experiencing a rise in violence stemming from militant Islamist groups and an influx of homemade weaponry. These aren't the firearms you're thinking of when you hear, "homemade", but well machined weapons crafted from scrap metal at junkyards. Pretty impressive, if only they weren't in the hands of extremists...and children. This is just another example of people being able to create weapons regardless of laws prohibiting them. Thanks to Vice for covering the issues the world wants swept under the rug. Check out the full episode on HBO-Vice S01E01. http://www.liveleak.com/view?i=3dd_1368765251 ObamaroidsRx Child Militias and Underground Gun Smiths in the Philippines Philippines, violence, elections, underground, gun smith, homemade, zip gun, rpg, child, soldier, political, Islam, extremist, terror, Thu, 16 May 2013 17:09:45 -0400 http://www.liveleak.com/view?i=28a_1368738408 SunniLebanese Syria crisis threatens Palestinian refugeesPro- and anti-Assad factions seek support of Palestinians in Lebanon's refugee camps as tensions there rise over Syria. Zak Brophy Last Modified: 16 May 2013 10:49 The Palestinian community in Lebanon is socially vulnerable and politically divided Beirut, Lebanon - The Palestinian refugee camp of Shatila is perilously wedged along one of Lebanon's many sectarian fault lines. Black Islamic flags adorn the lampposts when approaching this small slum from Sunni strongholds to the north, while expansive Shia ghettoes border the camp immediately to the south. In recent months, an increasing number of clashes have erupted in and around Shatila, as rival Lebanese factions fight for the loyalty of the socially vulnerable and politically divided Palestinian camps. The Syrian civil war and rising Shia-Sunni discord in Lebanon are exacerbating the pressure. "These are concerted efforts to provoke a response," explained Fathi Abou al-Ardat, secretary for the Fatah movement and the Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO) in Lebanon. On May 12, clashes - described by local residents as the most intense fighting yet - erupted between groups inside Shatila and neighbouring Shia communities. Volleys of gunfire were exchanged for several hours, and the army encircled the camp with armoured personnel carriers. "We know the Palestinians are divided and some groups are exploiting that to stir things up here. We are not taking the bait, but these groups have to know that if they push too hard we will run all over them like we did in 2008," said Abu Ali, a resident of the Rihaab district, a predominantly Shia neighbourhood on the edge of Shatila. Palestinian refugees struggle in Lebanon Although Shatila was founded as a Palestinian refugee camp, many non-Palestinians now live there as well. Ahmad, a 20-year-old Shatila resident with little education and scant work prospects, reasoned: "Us Sunna reacted strongly and started to boil over when we saw the killing in Syria. This caused clashes with Shia because they are helping with the slaughter of our people there." Losing faith Syrian President Bashar al-Assad comes from the Alawite sect - an offshoot of Shia Islam - and the powerful Lebanese Shia group Hezbollah supports Assad. Like many of his peers, Ahmad has lost faith in the traditional Sunni leadership and places his trust instead with more religiously conservative and combative leaders such as Sheikh Ahmad Assir, who have been trying to garner support from predominantly Sunni Palestinians. "There are more and more of us prepared to follow Assir," said Ahmad. "More and more people are becoming increasingly religious. Everyone is preparing himself for what may come." The Palestinian camps in Lebanon consist of basic, overcrowded homes, their people victims of decades of war, neglect and abuse. In Shatila, the buildings are so cramped that sunlight is a rare commodity. The smells of garbage and sewage foul the air and unemployed youth fill the cramped alleys. "We are seeing increased efforts to recruit from our youth. There is desperation and anger here, so whatever they pay they will find people to say 'yes'. They think we are cheap," said Ayman Zaher, a youth worker in Shatila. All of the major Palestinian political parties have adopted, and until now managed to maintain, a policy of neutrality in Lebanon regardless of their stance on the conflict in Syria. However, in Ein el-Helweh, the largest and most populous camp in Lebanon, armed groups such as Jund al-Sham, Jabhat al-Nusra and Asbat al-Ansar have found a safe haven under the protective wing of powerful local families. Their number of followers may not be huge, but their hard-line ideology and links to like-minded movements in Lebanon and Syria make Ein el-Helweh a particularly worrying flashpoint for Palestinians and Lebanese alike. "There is so much pressure on the camps and they are ready to explode, especially Ein el-Helweh, which could go off before there is a wider conflict in Lebanon. There is so much provocation from the Islamist groups there and I'm not sure if the PLO can keep a lid on it," warned Mutuwalli Abu Naser, a Palestinian journalist and playwright from Yarmouk camp in Damascus, who now lives in Lebanon. SpotlightIn-depth coverage of escalating violence across Syria Syrian influence On the other side, Hezbollah and its allies have also been working to secure the allegiance of Palestinians in Lebanon. Until withdrawing its troops from Lebanon in 2005, the Syrian government was influential in many of the camps through various Palestinian allies. Since the Syrian withdrawal, Hezbollah has by-and-large maintained Syria's leverage in the camps, even though the stance of several Palestinian groups has shifted since the start of the Syrian uprising. "Hezbollah works by a very low profile without making noise, because they work with the Palestinians from a security background, not a political one," explained Edward Kattoura, a political analyst at Pursue, a Palestinian think-tank. Many of the Palestinian camps are located in Hezbollah-dominated areas, especially in Beirut, South Lebanon and the Bekaa Valley. Recently, Shaker Berjawi - a Sunni "strongman" in Beirut who earned his battlefield stripes in the Lebanese civil war - decided to move the headquarters of his pro-Syrian Arab Movement Party to the edge of Shatila, indicating the importance of the camp's support. While maintaining a local influence over the years, he has switched political allegiances numerous times, and he is now aligned with the Hezbollah-led camp. "It seems people use us as mercenaries, whether it be for one side or the other. When he opens up his office at the entrance to the camps, he is sending a message that the camps are part of his fight," said Kattoura. 'Sacrificial lamb' But many Palestinians in Lebanon are driven by nationalist rather than sectarian sensibilities, and the camps may be able to stay out of internal Lebanese conflict. "Most of Lebanese have a view of the camps as a source of militia fighters and criminals. There is destitution and desperation, it is true, but in fact they are much less sectarian than most of Lebanese society," said Moe Ali Nayel, a Lebanese writer and activist who regularly works in the camps. "The Palestinians are used like a sacrificial lamb in Lebanon. Lebanese groups like to have Palestinians up front and then the blame can be put on us. " - Marwan Abdulal, Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine And the Palestinians' time in Lebanon has cruelly taught them while their loyalty is dear, their blood is cheap, whether it be the massacre at Sabra and Shatila at the hands of Christian militias in 1982, the "War of the Camps" from 1985-87 between the Shia Amal Movement and Palestinian refugees, or the bombardment of Nahr Bared camp by the Lebanese army in 2007. "The Palestinians are used like a sacrificial lamb in Lebanon. Lebanese groups like to have Palestinians up front and then the blame can be put on us," said Marwan Abdulal, member of the political bureau for the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine. The Palestinian camps can hope to stay detached from the conflict in Lebanon as long as the fighting is constrained to the prevailing pattern of intermittent local clashes and firebrand speeches. However, should the situation escalate, residents will be hard pressed not to get dragged into the affray. "It will be very difficult for the camps to stay aside if this descends into a serious fitna ," warned the PLO's Fathi Abou al-Ardat. "The general atmosphere, the speeches, all of it is setting the stage for a fitna . In reality, it is already here." http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2013/05/20135791049958517.html http://www.liveleak.com/view?i=28a_1368738408 SunniLebanese Syria vis a vis the Palestinians in Lebanon in case you were wondering Syria, Lebanon, Palestine, Palestinians, FSA, SAA, Hezbollah Thu, 16 May 2013 16:09:01 -0400 http://www.liveleak.com/view?i=960_1368734095 RasputinFTW The Terrorists used everything included Suicide bombers to breach the Walls The article is how is Usual the sane fucking Anti Assad bullshit but they can not hide the Reality Snackbars got fucked. _________________________ Syrian Troops Repel Rebel Attack on Aleppo Prison Syrian rebels withdrew from a prison in the northern city of Aleppo Thursday after heavy fighting with government troops, an activist group said, as it more than doubled its tally of deaths from sectarian killings in a coastal city earlier this month.The Britain-based Syrian Observatory for Human Rights raised the death toll from the May 3 sectarian killings in the coastal city of Banias to 145 from 62. Activists said at the time that troops and pro-government gunmen stormed the predominantly Sunni Muslim neighborhood of Ras Nabeh and killed dozens.The violence in the coastal region of Syria underscored the sectarian nature of the two-year conflict, which has killed tens of thousands and forced more than 1 million Syrians to flee to neighboring countries.Syria's Sunni majority forms the backbone of the rebellion, while President Bashar Assad's minority Alawite sect, an offshoot of Shiite Islam, anchors the regime's security services and the military's officer corps. Other minorities, such as Christians, largely support Assad or stand on the sidelines, worried that the regime's fall would bring about a more Islamist rule.Rami Abdul-Rahman, who heads the Observatory, said some of the people who have been missing in Banias have turned out to be dead. He said the 145 include 34 children and 40 women."This is one of the ugliest massacres that took place in Syria," said Abdul-Rahman, adding that all the 145 killed were civilians. "What happened in Banias was sectarian cleansing."The killings in Banias came a day after regime troops and gunmen from nearby Alawite areas allegedly beat, stabbed and shot at least 50 people in the nearby Sunni Muslim village of Bayda.The violence in Banias and Bayda bears a close resemblance to two reported mass killings last year in Houla and Qubeir, Sunni villages surrounded by Alawite towns. Some activists said the Houla and Qubeir carnage, which they blame on regime forces and associated militias, was aimed at driving Sunnis from areas near main routes to the coast in order to ensure Alawite control there.Abdul-Rahman said some fighters were among the dead in Bayda and Houla. Another activist group, the Local Coordination Committees, said earlier this month that 102 people were killed in Banias. It said then that some people were still missing.In Aleppo, the rebel assault at the Aleppo prison began at dawn Wednesday with two simultaneous car bombs detonated at its entrance. By nightfall, the rebels had not dislodged regime forces or freed some 4,000 prisoners held there.The Observatory said Syrian warplanes bombarded areas around the prison causing casualties among rebels. State news agency SANA denied opposition fighters entered the prison compound, saying regime troops had repelled the attack.The Observatory also reported that government troops shelled rebel-held northern and southern neighborhoods of the capital Damascus, adding that warplanes carried out at least two air raids on the Damascus suburb of Sbineh.The Observatory and the LCC said troops also shelled the town of Halfaya in the central province of Hama. Both groups said rebels carried out attacks against regime forces in the town of Khan al-Assal in Aleppo province.Syria's crisis, which began in March 2011 with pro-democracy protests and later turned into a civil war that has killed an estimated 70,000 people, has taken on increasingly sectarian overtones. http://www.liveleak.com/view?i=960_1368734095 RasputinFTW Snackbars Al Qaeda terrorits Pedophiles Fail in ' Aleppo Offencive ' Syrian Army, Syrian Arab Army, FSA, Al Qaeda, Free Syrian Army Wed, 15 May 2013 21:21:53 -0400 http://www.liveleak.com/view?i=cab_1368666389 MAKMAK Around $900 billion in assets across the globe are managed by Islamic banks that operate according to sharia, an interpretation of Islamic law. In recent years, so-called Islamic finance has been growing at a rate of 15-20 per cent a year, and proved remarkably resilient to the financial crisis. Proponents of the relatively new sector point to its back-to-basics financial structures, which have made it popular with a number of non-Mulsim clients who have little appetite for risk. Critics, though, say the restrictions it comes with-prohibitions, for example, on paying interest and investing in anything that involves porn, pork or booze-are archaic and unworkable. Canada, with its 1.3 million Muslims, has lagged behind countries like the U.K. and the U.S. in embracing sharia-compliant financial products. None of the country's big banks currently offer sharia-compliant services, though some smaller players do. Toronto-based UM Financial Inc., which issued home mortgages conforming to Islamic law, filed for bankruptcy last year, leaving 170 Muslim borrowers in limbo, and opening a legal can of worms. Is the firm's failure evidence that Canada should steer clear of Islamic finance; or proof that the country needs more of it-i.e. that the banks and policymakers need to bring the practice into the mainstream, with tighter rules and better oversight? We asked the experts to chime in. Tarek Fatah is the founder of the Muslim Canadian Congress, a liberal-minded grassroots organization. He is also the author of Chasing a Mirage: The Tragic lllusion of an Islamic State, among other works. Walid Hejazi is associate professor of international business at the University of Toronto's Rotman School of Management, where he is currently teaching an MBA course on Islamic finance. What is Islamic finance? Fatah: In the words of one New York Muslim banker, Islamic finance is little more than "a $300 billion deception." According to Muhammad Saleem, former president and CEO of Park Avenue Bank, "Islamic banks do not practise what they preach: they all charge interest, but disguised in Islamic garb." In fact, Islamic finance is just one more front in the worldwide Islamist movement's attempt to depict all things Western as essentially inimical to Islam. Its foundational doctrine comes from the writings of two people: Abul Ala Maudoodi of the Jamaat-e-Islami movement in Pakistan and Hassan al-Banna of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt. While these two pillars of the Pan-Islamist movement propagated jihad and war against the West, they also recognized the role international financial institutions could play in carrying out their political objectives. The theory was put into practice when the Islamist Pakistani military dictator General Zia-ul-Haq established sharia law in Pakistan, forcing the country's public-sector banks to run their operations based on Islamic principles and without the role of interest. As professor Timur Kuran, who taught Islamic thought at the University of Southern California, notes in his brilliant book Islam and Mammon: The Economic Predicaments of Islamism, "There is no distinctly Islamic way to build a ship, or defend a territory, or cure an epidemic, or forecast the weather." Hejazi: Islamic Finance allows individuals or companies to invest in conformity with the principles of Islam. In the aftermath of the financial crisis, though, Islamic finance has been extending its appeal to a wide range of clients-regardless of religion-because it relies on rather conservative and low-risk banking practices. It is critical to emphasize that sharia-compliant or Islamic financial products can be made available to anyone-not just Muslims. There are five key elements that must be avoided in Islamic finance: interest (riba); speculation (maisir); uncertainty (gharar); unjust enrichment/unfair exploitation; and unethical purpose. I will focus on the most well-known-and, I would argue, the least understood-dimension of Islamic finance: the ban on interest. Many interpret this ban to mean that money can be borrowed for free. This is not the case. Rather, it implies that the investor must have a stake in the underlying asset. What does this mean in practice? Here's an example (in which I am abstracting from differences that can arise in risk and administrative costs): Suppose you purchase a home for $300,000. Under a conventional mortgage, you may opt for a five-year, fixed-rate mortgage, say at five per cent, and amortized over 25 years. Your monthly payment would be about $1,745. Assuming that interest rates stay at five per cent, the amount that you would have to pay over the 25 year amortization period would be $1,744.81*300 months over 25 years = $523,443.00. In total, the homeowner will have repaid the $300,000 in principal plus $223,443.00 in interest. In reality, though, interest rates would vary and the mortgage would be renewed at whatever the prevailing rate is upon maturity of the mortgage. With one form of sharia-compliant mortgage, the bank would buy the home on behalf of the customer for $300,000 and then sell it to the customer for $523,443.00. It means that over the 25-year period, the customer pays the fixed payment of $1,744.81, but unlike in the case of a conventional mortgage, there are no changes in these payments over the duration of the mortgage. A second difference is that late penalties are not allowed-the bank cannot charge punitive fees if a homeowner, for example, is laid off and has difficulty making some of the payments. It all goes back to the key principles above around partnership, fairness and eliminating uncertainty. Should Canada embrace Islamic finance? Hejazi: It is in the interest of Canadians to embrace Islamic finance, both on the retail and the commercial side. On the retail side, Statistics Canada estimates that Muslims will be about seven per cent of the Canadian population by 2031. A recent study prepared for the Canada Mortgage and Housing Corporation reported evidence indicating that the demand for sharia-compliant mortgages currently exceeds supply. This demand will only increase. We need to bring these Canadians into the financial mainstream and give them better access to a type of financing that is consistent with their religious principles. Doing so is entirely consistent with fundamental Canadian values and our proud history. These sharia-compliant mortgages would be profitable and self-financing-they would impose no extra cost to the institutions offering them or the Canadian government. In addition, these mortgages would be available to all Canadians, who feel that the structure of the mortgage better fits their personal risk and financial profile. Perhaps more important, though, is the commercial side. As my research has documented, Canada needs more foreign investment and our country has been slipping behind in terms of its attractiveness to foreign investors. Now, the Gulf region has a tremendous amount of excess liquidity-upwards of a trillion dollars! However, investors from that region often require their investments be sharia-compliant. The Rotman School, in conjunction with Deloitte, Bennet Jones, Torys, and King and Spalding have developed case studies in which we looked at whether sharia-compliant financial structures would be more costly than conventional ones in the context of three major Canadian projects. Our analysis found that the costs associated with a sharia financing structure were similar to those of the conventional financing structure. Having a capability within Canada to undertake these transactions will make Canada more attractive to foreign investment, and this will help grow the economy and enhance the prosperity of all Canadians. Fatah: Canadian banks and financial institutions are already flirting with the idea. Can we blame them? Who wouldn't want gullible consumers who demand zero interest on their deposits but are willing to pay more on their monthly mortgage payments, all in the name of Islam and avoiding eternal hellfire. Islamists are lining up with such icons of global capitalism as Citibank NA, HSBC Holdings PLC, and Barclays PLC, which have all endorsed sharia banking and started offering Islamic financing products to a vulnerable Muslim population. Promoting these products, of course, are a number of prominent Muslim corporate lawyers and bankers. This push from Muslim banking executives working inside the corporate world has had some success. While the Royal Bank of Canada didn't find enough market interest for a sharia finance product it tested a few years ago, other Canadian banks are smelling easy pickings and lining up to wear the Islamic mantle. Scotiabank and Toronto-Dominion Bank have been quietly considering whether to start offering sharia-compliant products as part of the big banks' strategy to reach out to a growing "immigrant population," a politically correct way of labeling Muslims. Canada should not permit this charade of lies and deception posing as multicultural banking to segregate its Muslim population from the rest of society. If it does, there will be a huge cost to our values and to our future as well as to vulnerable Muslim-Canadians who are being blackmailed into paying more and receiving less for their banking needs. Suppose mainstream Canadian institutions started offering Islamic financial instruments, making them widely available throughout the country. How would this affect, if at all, the integration of Canada's Muslim minority? Fatah: The question assumes there is one Muslim community. I suggest there are many and they will react in different manner. My cursory study of the clients of now-bankrupt mortgage lender UM Financial shows that the company appeals mostly to customers from the Indo-Pakistan subcontinent and Caucasian converts to Islam, with Arab-Canadians and Iranian-Canadians virtually absent. Thus the integration of Canada's Muslims into the rest of society has very little to do with the success or failure of Islamic banking; it has everything to do with the failed policies of multiculturalism that encourage segregation and make it difficult to propagate Canadian values that have crystallized over 400 years of Western civilization and are the core of who we are as a country. Charlatans attempting to squeeze money out of an already marginalized minority community should be an affront to all of us-Muslim and non-Muslim alike. Hejazi: If the mainstream financial institutions offered sharia-compliant financial instruments, such as mortgages, savings accounts, mutual funds, and so on, this would go a long way towards integrating conservative Muslims into mainstream financial markets and keeping our financial system strong and sound. At present sharia-compliant financial securities are not available in the mainstream; hence conservative Muslims who feel they must use sharia-complaint financial instruments are forced to deal with smaller, less well-known, less well-funded, and likely less well-managed financial institutions. Providing these Muslim-Canadians with this option does not come with any negatives. Who opts for sharia-based financial instruments? To whom does this model appeal? Hejazi: The Financial Times reports that the assets within the Islamic finance sector have now reached US$900 billion, double what they amounted to in 2006. This growth is remarkable given that it occurred during the global financial crisis. A recent report by the International Monetary Fund attributes the growth in Islamic finance to three factors: increasing demand from the growing number of Muslims living in Western countries; growing oil wealth among the Islamic members of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries; and the attractiveness of sharia-compliant financial products and services to non-Muslims seeking ethical investments or fair financial products, as well as lower-risk, back-to-basics banking. Fatah: The primary movers and shakers of sharia-based financial instruments are the rulers of the petro-dollar states of the Persian Gulf. In the working class neighborhoods of Karachi, Jakarta, Cairo or Tehran, no one buys into this "paying more and receiving less" model. They may vote for Islamist parties, but when it comes to their hard-earned money, they trust their banks and credit unions, not the mullahs bearing tickets to paradise. Even in Pakistan, which has played a pioneering role in Islamic finance, few have embraced the Islamic banking institutions. Even in Saudi Arabia, home of the Islamic Development Bank, no-interest sharia banks did not find favour with the country's monetary agency, SAMA. In fact, as pious a leader as the late King Faisal allowed SAMA to place its surplus funds in interest-bearing accounts during the country's cash-strapped years in the 1950s and 60s. One thing is for sure: Muslims have voted with their feet and their chequebooks. UM Financial, a Canada-based Islamic financial institution, recently went belly up. What lessons does the bankruptcy hold for Islamic finance in Canada? Hejazi: At present, Canadians seeking sharia-compliant mortgages and other financial products are forced to turn to institutions which operate at the periphery of the financial system, such as UM Financial, because these services are not offered through mainstream financial institutions. As is now well known, Canada's financial markets are among the most stable and well-managed globally. A collapse such as that at UM Financial is not consistent with Canada's image, nor should such institutions be able to put so many Canadian homeowners at risk. Canada needs the financial mainstream to offer these products. It is mainstream institutions that should be reaping a profit from these instruments. The demise of UM Financial makes the case for bringing Islamic finance into the mainstream even stronger. Besides, as more Canadian institutions enter the Islamic finance market, competition will force the cost of sharia-banking products down to the level of their conventional equivalents. As noted in a recent CMHC study, in Canada, sharia-compliant mortgages currently cost between one and three per cent more than comparable conventional mortgages due to their modest supply and firms' relative inexperience with these products, as well as a lack of access to funding. In contrast, sharia-compliant mortgages in the U.S. cost only 0.4 to one per cent more than their conventional counterparts. Fatah: The bankruptcy of UM Financial tells a simple truth: most Muslims would not want anything to do with financial institutions that promise a path to Paradise while enriching the pockets of those who sell Islamic indulgences. Court documents reveal that, just a few days before UM Financial went into receivership, its Sharia Advisory Board invoiced it for $2.1 million. This amount was ostensibly the fee charged for providing advice to UM Financial on the compliance of its products and services to sharia law. In a scene that could have come straight out of a Bollywood crime thriller, UM Financial CEO Omar Kalair made this payment in gold and silver bullion at a Rexdale Parking lot, late into the night. The recipient, Joseph Adam, the finance manager of Multicultural Consultancy Canada, is said to have later flown to Egypt and is now reported missing-along with the gold. Canada has no room for charlatans who bring the medieval values of the pre-industrial era into the twenty-first century. Enough of this please. (original article by Erica Alini for Macleans magazine) Here's an interesting website listing some of the institutions which fund terrorism:https://moneyjihad.wordpress.com/2013/01/07/sharia-banks-that-fund-terrorism/ http://www.liveleak.com/view?i=cab_1368666389 MAKMAK Does Islamic finance have a place in Canada? islamic finance, global, currency, markets, stocks, stock market, dow, NASDAQ, Wall Street, TSX, Canada, MAKMAK Tue, 14 May 2013 23:38:41 -0400 http://www.liveleak.com/view?i=095_1368589022 Joseph_21 The big questions buzzing over Boston Bombers Tamerlan and Dzhokhar Tsarnaev have a single answer: It emerged in the 102 tense hours between the twin Boston Marathon bombings Monday, April 15 - which left three dead, 180 injured and a police officer killed at MIT - and Dzohkhar's capture Friday, April 19 in Watertown. The conclusion reached by DEBKAfile's counterterrorism and intelligence sources is that the brothers were double agents, hired by US and Saudi intelligence to penetrate the Wahhabi jihadist networks which, helped by Saudi financial institutions, had spread across the restive Russian Caucasian. Instead, the two former Chechens betrayed their mission and went secretly over to the radical Islamist networks. By this tortuous path, the brothers earned the dubious distinction of being the first terrorist operatives to import al Qaeda terror to the United States through a winding route outside the Middle East - the Caucasus. This broad region encompasses the autonomous or semi-autonomous Muslim republics of Dagestan, Ingushetia, Kabardino-Balkaria, Chechnya, North Ossetia and Karachyevo-Cherkesiya, most of which the West has never heard of. Moscow however keeps these republics on a tight military and intelligence leash, constantly putting down violent resistance by the Wahhabist cells, which draw support from certain Saudi sources and funds from the Riyadh government for building Wahhabist mosques and schools to disseminate the state religion of Saudi Arabia. The Saudis feared that their convoluted involvement in the Caucasus would come embarrassingly to light when a Saudi student was questioned about his involvement in the bombng attacks while in a Boston hospital with badly burned hands. They were concerned to enough to send Saudi Foreign Minister Prince Saudi al-Faisal to Washington Wednesday, April 17, in the middle of the Boston Marathon bombing crisis, for a private conversation with President Barack Obama and his national security adviser Tom Donilon on how to handle the Saudi angle of the bombing attack. That day too, official Saudi domestic media launched an extraordinary three-day campaign. National and religious figures stood up and maintained that authentic Saudi Wahhabism does not espouse any form of terrorism or suicide jihadism and the national Saudi religion had nothing to do with the violence in Boston. "No matter what the nationality and religious of the perpetrators, they are terrorists and deviants who represent no one but themselves." Prince Saud was on a mission to clear the 30,000 Saudi students in America of suspicion of engaging in terrorism for their country or religion, a taint which still lingers twelve years after 9/11. He was concerned that exposure of the Tsarnaev brothers' connections with Wahhabist groups in the Caucasus would revive the stigma. The Tsarnaevs' recruitment by US intelligence as penetration agents against terrorist networks in southern Russia explains some otherwise baffling features of the event: 1. An elite American college in Cambridge admitted younger brother Dzhokhar and granted him a $2,500 scholarship, without subjecting him to the exceptionally stiff standard conditions of admission. This may be explained by his older brother Tamerlan demanding this privilege for his kid brother in part payment for recruitment. 2. When in 2011, a "foreign government" (Russian intelligence) asked the FBI to screen Tamerlan for suspected ties to Caucasian Wahhabist cells during a period in which they had begun pledging allegiance to al Qaeda, the agency, it was officially revealed, found nothing incriminating against him and let him go after a short interview. He was not placed under surveillance. Neither was there any attempt to hide the fact that he paid a long visit to Russia last year and on his return began promoting radical Islam on social media. Yet even after the Boston marathon bombings, when law enforcement agencies, heavily reinforced by federal and state personnel, desperately hunted the perpetrators, Tamerlan Tsarnaev was never mentioned as a possible suspect 3. Friday, four days after the twin explosions at the marathon finishing line, the FBI released footage of Suspect No. 1 in a black hat and Suspect No. 2 in a white hat walking briskly away from the crime scene, and appealed to the public to help the authorities identify the pair. We now know this was a charade. The authorities knew exactly who they were. Suddenly, during the police pursuit of their getaway car from the MIT campus on Friday, they were fully identified. The brother who was killed in the chase was named Tamerlan, aged 26, and the one who escaped, only to be hunted down Saturday night hiding in a boat, was 19-year old Dzhokhar. Our intelligence sources say that we may never know more than we do today about the Boston terrorist outrage which shook America - and most strikingly, Washington - this week. We may not have the full story of when and how the Chechen brothers were recruited by US intelligence as penetration agents - any more than we have got to the bottom of tales of other American double agents who turned coat and bit their recruiters. Here is just a short list of some of the Chechen brothers' two-faced predecessors: In the 1980s, an Egyptian called Ali Abdul Saoud Mohamed offered his services as a spy to the CIA residence in Cairo. He was hired, even though he was at the time the official interpreter of Ayman al-Zuwahiri, then Osama bin Laden's senior lieutenant and currently his successor. He accounted for this by posing as a defector. But then, he turned out to be feeding al Qaeda US military secrets. Later, he was charged with Al Qaeda's 1998 bombings of US embassies in Nairobi and Dar es-Salaam. On Dec. 30, 2009, the Jordanian physician Humam Khalil al-Balawi, having gained the trust of US intelligence in Afghanistan as an agent capable of penetrating al Qaeda's top ranks, detonated a bomb at a prearranged rendezvous in Kost, killing the four top CIA agents in the country. Then, there was the French Muslim Mohamed Merah. He was recruited by French intelligence to penetrate Islamist terror cells in at least eight countries, including the Caucasus. At the end of last year, he revealed his true spots in deadly attacks on a Jewish school in Toulouse and a group of French military commandoes. The debate has begun over the interrogation of the captured Boston bomber Dzhokhar Tsarmayev when he is fit for questioning after surgery for two bullet wounds and loss of blood. The first was inflicted during the police chase in which his brother Tamerlan was killed. An ordinary suspect would be read his rights (Miranda) and be permitted a lawyer. In his case, the "public safety exemption" option may be invoked, permitting him to be questioned without those rights, provided the interrogation is restricted to immediate public safety concerns. President Barack Obama is also entitled to rule him an "enemy combatant" and so refer him to a military tribunal and unrestricted grilling. According to DEBKAfile's counter terror sources, four questions should top the interrogators' agenda: a) At what date did the Tsarnaev brothers turn coat and decide to work for Caucasian Wahhabi networks? b) Did they round up recruits for those networks in the United States - particularly, among the Caucasian and Saudi communities? c) What was the exact purpose of the Boston Marathon bombings and their aftermath at MIT in Watertown? d) Are any more terrorist attacks in the works in other American cities? Source : http://www.debka.com/article/22914/ http://www.liveleak.com/view?i=095_1368589022 Joseph_21 The Tsarnaev brothers were double agents who decoyed US into terror trap usa, attack, chechen, terror, boston