http://www.liveleak.com/browse?q=Shangri-La Thu, 23 May 2013 19:39:58 -0400 Liveleak http://edge.liveleak.com/80281E/u/u/ll2/logo.gif http://www.liveleak.com/browse?q=Shangri-La Thu, 28 Feb 2013 16:37:28 -0500 http://www.liveleak.com/view?i=dfc_1362087344 Ruthieal_Kalm Pakistan - The Road To Shangri-La - Journeys To The Ends Of The Earth http://www.liveleak.com/view?i=dfc_1362087344 Ruthieal_Kalm Pakistan - The Road To <span class="highlight">Shangri-La</span> - Journeys To The Ends Of The Earth Pakistan - The Road To Shangri-La - Journeys To The Ends Of The Earth Fri, 05 Apr 2013 15:02:14 -0400 http://www.liveleak.com/view?i=d3b_1365188402 ConspiracyTardLL February 1967, the Aircraft Carrier U.S.S. Shangri-La is cruising the Mediterranean sea on an 8 month deployment with the Sixth Fleet. Aboard are Thirteen young Sailors starting to think about what they will do after their service in the Navy was over. As they were all fanatic motorcycle enthusiasts, who liked to party, they all decided to start a Motorcycle Club. Agreeing on the name Warlocks, One of the thirteen designed the Blazing style Eagle, Which to this day, is unchanged on the backs of all Warlocks Brothers. They then made plans, that each of the thirteen new Brothers would found a Chapter in his hometown after retiring from the Navy. With most of the members, the euphoria passed very quickly after their return from Service. But one Brother, who took this commitment seriously enough to make this dream a reality, was Grub from Lockhart Florida. The Original Chapter he founded was on the outskirts of Orlando Florida, where the Orlando Mother chapter remains to this day. In the last four decades the Warlocks Motorcycle Club has grown tremendously. Hosting several chapters in the United States, England and Germany, with our Nomads scattered through out the states and abroad. Wikipedia: The Warlocks Motorcycle Club was founded in 1967 in Florida, USA by ex-US naval servicemen serving on the USS Shangri-La aircraft carrier. It is a "one-percenter" motorcycle club with chapters in various parts of the United States, UK and Germany. Established by Tom "Grub" Freeland, an ex-US Navy sailor, on the outskirts of Orlando, Florida in 1967, its Mother Chapter is still based there. They have over nine chapters in Florida, one in Georgia, six in South Carolina, four in Virginia, three in West Virginia, one in New York, two in Lincolnshire, England, two in Germany and one in Canada. There are also several Nomads who live and work in states that don't have Warlocks chapters. The club's insignia is a blazing phoenix between a top and bottom rockers, and their colors are black, red and yellow and motto "Warlocks forever, forever Warlocks" ("W.F.F.W."). http://www.liveleak.com/view?i=d3b_1365188402 ConspiracyTardLL Gangland: Warlocks MC 1% - Orlando, Florida Warlocks, Motorcycle, Club Mon, 04 Mar 2013 13:47:36 -0500 http://www.liveleak.com/view?i=8d7_1362421532 Nuclear Fire Deep Underground National Military Command Center 15 August 2002 These documents are from the U.S. State Department, Johnson Administration, Foreign Relations 1964-1968, Volume X, National Security Policy, published 15 August 2002. For recent information and photos of the Alternate Joint Command Center (AJCC): http://cryptome2.org/site-r.htm Source: http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/frus/johnsonlb/x/9015.htm 3. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense McNamara/1/ /1/Source: Washington National Records Center, OSD Files: FRC 330 70 A 4662, 381 DUCC (10 Jan 64) 1963 and 64 Papers. Top Secret. JCSM-4-64 Washington, January 10, 1964. SUBJECT Deep Underground Command Center (DUCC) (S) 1. Reference is made to:/2/ /2/The four JCS papers referenced are ibid. The last reference was not found . a. JCSM-405-63, dated 29 May 1963. b. JCSM-484-63, dated 3 July 1963. c. JCSM-753-63, dated 27 September 1963. d. JCSM-914-63, dated 2 December 1963. e. Secretary of Defense Decision/Guidance (Format B), dated 19 December 1963, subject: Deep Underground Command Center. 2. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have considered on a continuing basis over the past several months the matter of the Deep Underground Command Center (DUCC). On those occasions in which this subject has been addressed directly (references 1a through 1d), the response has dealt with separate but related aspects of the problem. In view of the bearing of this matter on other programs under consideration, the Joint Chiefs of Staff wish to state their views as to the justification for a DUCC and as to the military requirement therefor. 3. It is the opinion of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that a DUCC as a military command center cannot be justified and it is not recommended for inclusion in the National Military Command System (NMCS) program for the following reasons: a. It would not, in their opinion, permit top military leaders to operate as effectively as would be possible through use of other survival means. Specifically, it would involve their operating without adequate staff or support in a "buttoned-up" environment from which communications and egress would be uncertain following a nuclear attack. b. The adverse effect of the DUCC on the NMCS program, planned to establish an effective and survivable system of command and control facilities, is exemplified best when viewed in relation to the long-term aspects of the program. The proposed funding for the Five-Year Program (FY 1965-69) indicates that approximately $860 million may be committed to the NMCS. The cost estimate for a 300-man DUCC is approximately $310 million which represents over 36 per cent of the total budget proposed for the NMCS. The $310 million basically provides for only construction costs, and does not include in-house or entrance communications equipment or operational support systems essential to the realization of initial operational capability. If the DUCC were to be included in the NMCS program, there are indications that it would absorb in future years considerably more than 36 per cent of the total NMCS funds now programmed for the NMCS, and, unless additional funds were provided, would thereby force severe reductions in other NMCS programs, such as deferral of the First Generation National Military Command Center, limitations in number and degree of enhancement of the more desirable mobile alternate command centers, and curtailment of communications and other support systems. c. The weakest link in a hardened communications system is the antenna. In view of limited progress to date in the design of hardened antennas, the probability of survival of DUCC communications depends primarily on redundancy of antennas. Various means of communications have been considered as possible solutions to this problem. One such means particularly suited for use in a DUCC installation is the substrata earth transmission of electromagnetic waves. However, research on this project has not progressed to the point where operational feasibility can be determined nor can reliable operational use be predicted with any degree of confidence. d. An examination of the functions to be performed by the National Command Authorities, which include the Joint Chiefs of Staff, indicates that for this decision group to operate within the isolated environment of a DUCC, adequate space and facilities to house sufficient staff personnel and to provide appropriate supporting data would require that the facility be considerably larger in size and scope than the 300-man DUCC estimated to cost $310 million. To meet the demands of nuclear war, it will be of vital importance that a tremendous volume of actions be performed swiftly by trained and experienced people. e. An austere size (50-man) DUCC would be totally inadequate to accommodate the decision element of the National Command Authorities together with minimum essential staff support and housekeeping support. It is clearly evident that a 50-man DUCC is essentially a survival facility. As a follow-on step, it is highly probable that immediate expansion to a 300-man DUCC will be required to provide a minimum national command facility. However, such an expanded DUCC would be inadequate for military purposes. 4. A deep underground facility could be useful as an emergency shelter to safeguard the President for continuity of government, provided escape and survivable communications can be assured. The following factors are considered germane to the issue: a. It would be a facility affording improved protection to which the President and a minimum number of selected advisors could rapidly relocate in times of international tension. b. The minimum amount of time would be lost during the relocation process, and confusion, disruption of operations, and adverse public impact would be minimized. c. Studies indicate that a deep underground facility could be designed to permit relocation within the time period now described as "tactical warning" due to its ready accessibility to the President and selected advisors. d. Escape and survivable communications from a DUCC would be problematical in case of a direct attack on Washington with large-yield nuclear weapons. 5. In summary, the Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that the DUCC would be too small, and its communications too uncertain, to serve as a military command center. They recommend against the allocation of resources to such a facility at the expense of existing and currently planned elements of the NMCS. They consider that it is a question for executive decision as to whether the DUCC would be worth its cost as a safe shelter for the President and a minimum number of selected advisors, from which he might or might not be able to communicate in case of attack. For the Joint Chiefs of Staff: Maxwell D. Taylor/3/ Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff /3/Printed from a copy that indicates Taylor signed the original. Source: http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/frus/johnsonlb/x/9015.htm 4. Memorandum From the President's Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kaysen) to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)/1/ /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Subject File, Deep Underground Command Center, Box 8. Top Secret. Washington, January 16, 1964. Harold Brown and I discussed the matter of the DUCC this morning. In view of the problems between the Secretary and the JCS,/2/ we agreed that the best way to handle the matter was to create a limited interdepartmental committee to study the problem from the point of view of the civilian top level of Government; and at the same time suggest to the Secretary of Defense that he request the Joint Chiefs to give their views on the nature of their relations with both the President-Secretary of State-Secretary of Defense level and the CINCs in a crisis situation toward the end of the sixties. The target date for this is the 15th of March. /2/For the views of the JCS, see Document 3. The purpose of this would be to get the Chiefs to deal explicitly with their view of the relations between the top civilian level and the operational commanders during the period of crisis, and make clear both their ideas of what kinds of crisis situations they are thinking of and the amount and character of communication they would expect in both directions from and on location. The interdepartmental study group would try to answer four questions, against the background of some likely scenarios of crisis in which a thermo-nuclear war is either imminent or has actually begun. A. What would the utility of the DUCC be in this situation in the late sixties? B. How big would the facility have to be in terms of the number of people it could hold to provide this utility? C. Are there any unresolved technical problems which would have to be dealt with to make the installation effective? D. What would its relation be to the other elements of the National Military Command System (NMCS)? Harold and I think the committee should be chaired formally by you, and that its members might be himself, Andy Goodpaster, Alex Johnson, Walt Rostow and Ray Cline. Spurgeon and I would join to represent you on the committee, and I could convene the meeting and act as Chairman in your absence. The main staff of the committee who would be available for full-time work would be furnished by Harold Brown's office. In addition, Jim Clark of BOB who is knowledgeable on these problems, might serve on its staff. E. Secretary McNamara might prefer to deal with this purely as an internal problem within the Department of Defense. However, the arguments for the other arrangement are convincing to Harold Brown and me. First, if there is to be a fight with the Congress, the President himself must be convinced of the need for the proposed facility, and this can best be done through the participation of his own staff. Second, there is not within the Pentagon the kind of experience that the White House-State-CIA are likely to have that is requisite to a thorough examination of the issues. While nobody has the relevant experience, the suggested group would come closer to having a basis for speculation about it than any other we can think of. CK Source: http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/frus/johnsonlb/x/9057.htm 52. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense McNamara/1/ /1/Source: Washington National Records Center, OSD Files: FRC 330 70 A 4662, 381 DUCC (10 Jan 64) 1963 and 64 Papers. Top Secret. JCSM-809-64 Washington, September 17, 1964. SUBJECT Deep Underground Command Center (DUCC) (S) 1. Reference is made to a memorandum by the Deputy Secretary of Defense, dated 21 August 1964, subject as above./2/ /2/Vance's August 21 memorandum to the Joint Chiefs of Staff summarized JCSM-446-64, "Proposed Deep Underground Command Center," May 25; went on to express some views on the proposed center; and concluded by asking the JCS to advise OSD of the "functions they believe the facility must be capable of performing and the number of people they believe the facility must house in order to perform those functions and to support the facility." Copies of JCS-446-64 and Vance's August 21 memorandum are ibid. 2. Within the context of the reference, the Joint Chiefs of Staff were requested to advise the Secretary of Defense as regards what functions they believe the Deep Underground Command Center (DUCC) should be capable of performing, and the number of people they believe the facility must house in order to perform these functions and to support the facility. 3. The Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that, if a DUCC is approved and constructed as an element of the National Military Command System (NMCS), it should be capable of performing those functions which support the Joint Chiefs of Staff in their role as principal military advisors to the President. If the President and his civilian and military advisors are to relocate to the DUCC, the facility must have the capability of performing the following pre-attack military functions as they pertain to international crisis situations and general nuclear war: a. To maintain a minimum data base on the world-wide status of forces, Single Integrated Operational Plan, and force generation levels to ensure that the President will have adequate information to support a decision to authorize, if necessary, the use of nuclear weapons. b. To maintain a capability to receive from external sources pertinent information on surveillance and analysis of the world situation, and indicator/warning data and current intelligence; and to maintain minimum facilities to conduct intelligence briefings on information and data received. c. To provide an effective means of: (1) communications with the commanders of the unified and specified commands; and (2) negotiations with allied and foreign governments and the United Nations. d. To receive, process, and use, as available and as necessary, information from the National Military Command Center and existing Alternate Command Centers and Command Posts of the NMCS and other government agencies. e. To maintain a state of readiness, including a current data base, to translate during the period of tactical warning from a standby condition to a fully capable primary Command Center to the extent permitted by the facilities provided, and prescribed by pertinent directives. 4. During the trans-attack and post-attack periods of a general nuclear war, a DUCC may be required to operate independently with information received directly from sources external to the Washington complex. In order to provide for this contingency, the DUCC must have the capability, within the context of a minimum facility, of performing the following functions in addition to those specified in the above paragraphs: a. To receive and display information on the military and political situation in order to determine as quickly and accurately as possible the time, magnitude, and objective of the attack. b. To disseminate decisions, orders, and instructions as to the appropriate action to be taken in response to an attack or threat of attack. c. To communicate, by the surest and most effective means possible, with the major elements of the World-Wide Military Command and Control System. 5. Communications requirements vary considerably between critical international crises and general war. A need exists for an extensive world-wide network of reliable communications during crisis situations. After general war begins, the emphasis would then switch to survivable communications among the major command centers of the World-Wide Military Command and Control System primarily for the strategic direction of the military forces. However, there would remain a need for communications with the principal civil defense centers, and for negotiations with the principal adversary. Therefore, it appears that the functions of command communications would require that the DUCC be equipped with communications which approximate the capability now planned for the Alternate National Military Command Center. 6. It appears that the concept and capability reflected in the National Emergency Airborne Command Post would represent the minimum capability required in a DUCC to serve as an emergency command post for decision-making by the President. It is envisioned that the decision group, which would relocate to the DUCC, would comprise the National Command Authorities with a minimum number of advisory personnel, and that they would remain in the DUCC in a post-attack situation only until the National Command Authorities could be relocated to a site from which the functions of government could more adequately be discharged. Basically, however, advisory information would be provided the DUCC by existing and surviving alternate command facilities equipped with larger data bases. A minimum data base would be maintained in the DUCC and staff support, to the extent feasible, would be provided to the decision group. 7. The determination of the precise number of people the DUCC must house in order to support the total mission of the facility, including the operation of the national government in crisis situations as well as the conduct of general nuclear war, would necessitate considerable liaison with the White House, and other departments and agencies of the national government. However, the Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that approximately 50 military personnel would be required to perform their part of the above functions in the manner described in the preceding paragraph. The figure does not include personnel for facility maintenance, communications, security, and housekeeping support for which about 175 additional people can be identified at this time. Additional functions and personnel possibly would be required to operate the national government in accordance with the desires of the President, and to the extent outlined in the reference. These latter requirements should be provided by the appropriate Departments and Agencies concerned, in order that the composite functional and personnel requirements, and hence the optimum size of the facility, may be established. For the Joint Chiefs of Staff: Earle G. Wheeler/3/ Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff /3/Printed from a copy that indicates Wheeler signed the original. Source: http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/frus/johnsonlb/x/9058.htm 77. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense McNamara /1/ /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Agency File, JCS, Filed by the LBJ Library, Box 29. Top Secret. JCSM-129-65 Washington, February 26, 1965. SUBJECT Conceptual Approach to the National Military Command System (NMCS) (U) 1. Reference is made to: a. A memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of Defense (ADM), dated 28 January 1965, subject as above./2/ /2/Not found. b. JCSM-4-64, dated 10 January 1964, subject: "Deep Underground Command Center (DUCC) (S)."/3/ /3/Document 3. ee above ] c. JCSM-446-64, dated 25 May 1964, subject "Deep Underground Command Center (DUCC) (S)."/4/ /4/See footnote 2, Document 52. See above ] d. JCSM-914-63, dated 2 December 1963, subject "Alternate Facilities and Supporting Communications Required for the National Military Command System (U)."/5/ /5/See footnote 2, Document 3. bove ] 2. Reference 1 a requested that the Joint Chiefs of Staff submit their views on a report, subject: "Department of Defense Command and Control Support to the President." 3. The Joint Chiefs of Staff are in broad general agreement with the principles and concepts developed in the study (see Appendix A hereto) and believe that the study provides an excellent basis for furthering rapport and understanding among the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, and other governmental agencies concerned with planning for command and control at the national level. The first assumption in the terms of reference states that it is extremely unlikely that the President would leave the Washington area during a crisis situation. It is noted that the study nevertheless advocates the principle of multiplicity of centers for Presidential protection and infers that the likelihood of Presidential relocation would significantly increase as a crisis intensifies, even if the crisis is short of general war. The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider these points to be valid both prior to and after construction of a Deep Underground Command Center (DUCC); however, continued improvement of national command and control capabilities depends on a better understanding between all principals of the conditions under which the President might seek protection. 4. With regard to the alternate command centers of the National Military Command System (NMCS), the Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that: a. The study's recommendation prejudges the conclusions of a separate study currently being undertaken by the Joint Chiefs of Staff regarding the optimum number of National Emergency Command Post Afloat (NECPA) ships required for the NMCS. b. The National Emergency Airborne Command Post (NEACP) program, in which one or more of three EC 135 aircraft are maintained on continuous ground alert status, represents the minimum acceptable airborne command post posture. c. There is firm need to assure, to the extent feasible, the survival of the Presidency during any future conflicts; and the circumstances of a future crisis or conflict may be such as to preclude the relocation of the President to one of the existing alternate facilities. In this light, the proposed DUCC represents a potentially effective means for assuring survival of the Presidency to an extent not now provided by the NMCS. 5. The Joint Chiefs of Staff: a. Concur in the study's comments on the NEACP. b. Agree in principle on the NECPA as an important element of the NMCS. In this connection, the Joint Chiefs of Staff are currently addressing the optimum posture for the NECPA and upon completion will forward their recommendations. c. Consider that, if a DUCC is approved and constructed, the study's detailed concepts and principles regarding the DUCC generally provide a basis for determination of detailed functional requirements, concept of operation, and detailed design. d. Are in general agreement with much of the detailed discussion in the body of the report regarding the role of the Alternate National Military Command Center (ANMCC). However, as indicated in Appendix B hereto, they do not feel that the study recognizes that the ANMCC is fully as valuable as the other alternates of the NMCS when its unique capabilities for supporting all levels of crisis and war are considered. Moreover, they have previously noted that it is essential to continue the ANMCC in its current role for the foreseeable future. 6. The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that: a. The study be forwarded to the Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, the Office of Emergency Planning, the Department of State, and the Central Intelligence Agency for comment regarding the principles and concepts underlying those parts of the study particularly applicable to their operations (see Appendix A). b. They participate in any evaluation of the comments received by the Secretary of Defense from other agencies and in the identification of subsequent steps to clarify the conceptual approach to command and control. For the Joint Chiefs of Staff: Earle G. Wheeler/6/ Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff /6/Printed from a copy that indicates Wheeler signed the original. Appendix A Based on their analysis, it is the interpretation of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that the following constitute the underlying principles and concepts developed in the Study: a. For all levels of crisis and war, the President needs utmost flexibility in many aspects of crisis management including centers to be used, immediate advisors, other staff elements to be informed, and options for military action. b. In crises short of general war, the constitution of the Presidential advisory staff support (support which is estimative analytical, and advisory) is highly dependent upon the nature of the crisis. In contrast, capabilities for information support (defined by the study to include watch, monitoring, communications, decision implementation functions, and emergency action procedures) of the President and his advisors must be developed insofar as possible in advance of a crisis and can be developed more independently of a particular type of crisis. Advisory staff support and information support, although they must work closely together, can be somewhat separated both functionally and organizationally. c. During intense crises and general war, protection of the President as an individual is as important or even more important than protection of the Presidency through use of legal successors. Although Alternate Decision Groups might be established and relocated, it is doubtful that the principals forming the groups will be named before the crisis and it is doubtful that more than one group will be formed./7/ /7/A handwritten note reads: "V.P.--I think 2 groups at least." d. For crises less than general war, the President and his advisory group do not need an elaborate, national command center permanently staffed by representatives of several agencies; however, the direction of the Armed Forces will be exercised through the National Military Command System (NMCS). e. During an intense crisis, protection of the President depends on his seeking protection prior to the onset of general war. He will only occupy a protected center if he can manage the intense crisis as well as he could from the White House Cabinet Room./8/ (For Washington level support during the intense crisis, the Presidential advisors located with the President will primarily depend on their soft centers and their staffs in Washington.) For managing the general war, it would be highly desirable for the President to be collocated with his general war advisory staff support and the related information support. In light of these needs for both intense crises and general war, the Alternate Command Centers of the NMCS and other centers that the President might occupy must be capable of operating as national (versus departmental) command centers. /8/Next to this sentence is written: "True." f. The basic missions of the alternate command centers of the NMCS have the following priority: (1) Support the President (located at the Center) during the intense crisis and the strategic exchange phase of a general war. (2) Support the President or an alternate decision group (located at the Center) during the strategic exchange phase of general war. (3) Locate the President after the onset of general war. (4) After onset of general war, provide military information and advisory staff support to the President or a legal successor located elsewhere. (5) Protect information and advisory staff capability for the follow-on phase of general war. In assigning the above missions and priorities, the study concludes that direction of the strategic exchange phase of a general war should be directly from the Presidential location to the commanders of unified and specified commands, their alternates, or successors. g. Under a "no warning attack" at a time of international calm, only marginal protection can be provided to the President or his designated successors. h. An alternate command center should be evaluated with respect to the following criteria: survivability, accessibility, endurance, staff support, communications support, flexibility, and cost. The study heavily emphasizes survivability and accessibility for individual centers and a multiplicity of centers of comparable capability. i. For the strategic exchange phase of a general war, the President and the Presidential Group will be directly and primarily concerned with military operations, civil defense, diplomacy and negotiations, and informing and leading the public. The President can extensively delegate responsibility for nonmilitary resource allocation, economic mobilization, and maintenance of local law and order. Accordingly, during this phase, the advisory and information support to the Presidential Group should be preponderantly military. j. The National Military Command Center (NMCC) should provide information support to the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, non-Department of Defense officials, and their attendant advisory staffs. Under certain circumstances, the NMCC will provide advisory support. The NMCC must have the capability to "get information" from many sources (such as CINCs and Service Headquarters) and should not attempt to store all possible information, but only that essential for its primary mission, in its data base. k. The NMCC and the Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff support the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff in exercising strategic direction of the Armed Forces. They should also support the President and his advisors in detailed monitoring and control of selected military actions when such actions may have grave national significance. A system built to satisfy only one of these roles will not necessarily be adequate for the other. Appendix B With regard to the Fort Ritchie Complex and the Alternate National Military Command Center (ANMCC), the Joint Chiefs of Staff reaffirm their previous position that these facilities are essential to our command and control capabilities in the foreseeable future. They concur with much of the analysis relating to the Alternate Joint Communications Center (AJCC) and the ANMCC and with many of the conclusions regarding their capabilities, functions, and relationships within our over-all national command and control capabilities. However, they are concerned that the study does not support these facilities strongly enough. Specifically: a. The value of the ANMCC as one possible relocation site for the President or an alternate decision group is recognized (pages V-35, 36 and VI-36) but its capabilities for the strategic exchange phase are equated to . This conclusion seems contrary to two principles in the study. First, survivability is stressed and the ANMCC is significantly harder than less than 1 line of source text not declassified ]. More important, the study stresses collocation of the President and his principal advisors with their supporting military staff. Such collocation could be achieved much more effectively at the ANMCC than at or Camp David. The study correctly proposes a multiplicity of sites available for relocation. If the individual sites for Presidential or alternate decision group relocation are compared, the Joint Chiefs of Staff would rate the effectiveness of the ANMCC as somewhere between that of a National Emergency Command Post Afloat ship and . b. There is not sufficient stress within the study on the potential value of the ANMCC in supporting a decision group on board the National Emergency Airborne Command Post during the strategic exchange phase after Washington has been destroyed. c. The study correctly recognizes the unique value of the ANMCC for the follow-on phase of a general war. However, since the dividing line between the initial and follow-on phases would be blurred at best, the study does not point out the great advantage of conducting both of these phases from the same location. d. The study implies that a functional and technical analysis of the ANMCC would indicate potential savings. Such analyses are continuously taking place and they may equally indicate that, if the principles and concepts in the study are approved, additional investments in the AJCC would be warranted. e. The report does not explicitly recommend continuation of a continuously manned ANMCC. The summary paragraphs discussing the AJCC (pages VI-72 and VII-10) are not consistent with the analyses and conclusions in the body of the report. For example, they indicate that "the ANMCC is not suited to use by the President or an alternate decision group during an intense crisis or the initial stages of a general war." If the report is rewritten, the body of the report should incorporate the above points and these summary paragraphs should be made consistent. Source: http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/frus/johnsonlb/x/9058.htm 86. Study Prepared in the Department of Defense /1/ /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Agency File, Department of Defense, Command and Control Support to the President, Box 20. Top Secret. The Introduction to the study indicates that it was prepared in response to a February 27, 1964, memorandum by Deputy Secretary of Defense Vance, which is included at the end of the study as Annex A. The Introduction also identifies Rear Admiral Paul P. Blackburn, Jr., Chief of the Joint Command and Control Requirements Group, Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, as chairman of the study; the other Defense members who prepared it; members of an advisory group and working group; and consultants (pp. i-iii). Washington, undated. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE COMMAND AND CONTROL SUPPORT TO THE PRESIDENT Chapter VII Summary of Conclusions and Recommendations The President increasingly becomes the focal point of crisis management as a crisis intensifies. He devotes more time to the crisis and considers selected operations in greater detail. The President needs and operates with extreme flexibility--flexibility in constituting his immediate decision group; in defining alternate courses of action that must be considered; in determining, to the extent feasible, the timing of the U.S. responses and therefore the time allowable for staff inputs; flexibility in seeking detailed information on selected military operations; in establishing and employing the organization and operational command chain including reducing the number of echelons of command; flexibility in determining the sensitivity of selected information relating to the crisis; in communicating with allied, neutral and enemy heads of state; and in establishing constraints or accepting risks in conducting the crisis. The President will select the Presidential Group that will assist him in directing a given crisis. This has invariably been true in the past and it is reasonable to assume that it will continue to be so in the future. Since the Presidential Group will include personal advisors, and statutory advisors and their subordinates, it will reflect military, political, diplomatic, intelligence and other such interests that might be relevant to the crisis. As a crisis develops, the composition of the Presidential Group will normally grow and alter. So far the U.S. has experienced only a very few of the infinite number of crisis situations with which command and control support arrangements must be prepared to cope. Crisis situations, far more intense than any yet experienced, but nevertheless short of a large scale intercontinental nuclear exchange, are possible. These should be given more consideration in the development of U.S. command and control arrangements. For example, as indicated below, consideration of intense crises can have a significant impact on plans for presidential protection. During a crisis the President and the Presidential Group will probably use mission-oriented interagency groups to assist them in estimating the present situation, and in developing and evaluating alternate courses of action. These groups may be asked to consider broad or narrow aspects of the crisis. The President and the Presidential Group expect that such support has melded military, political, domestic and diplomatic factors. Accordingly, the constitution of the Presidential Group and their need for staff support implies the need for interagency staffing before estimates and advice are advanced to the Presidential Group. For severe crises, the composition and extent of the advisory staff support to the President will be uniquely determined at the time of the crisis by the nature of the crisis including such factors as timing, areas and participants, scope of conflict, the opportunity and the need for secrecy, escalatory potential, and diplomatic constraints. On the other hand, the routine information support capabilities needed to support these individuals are much more predictable. These capabilities include communications and message distribution, provision of factual data on force status and plans, routine staff support in implementing and promulgating decisions, conferencing and display facilities, and the staff which operates and provides these capabilities. Accordingly, it is desirable and feasible to separate conceptually and organizationally the problem of providing the advisory staff support from that of providing the routine information support. It is difficult to improvise information support during a crisis and it is possible to anticipate the requirements for this support before the crisis. The reverse is true for staff advisory support. Presidential councils are informal and consultative in nature. The President receives his information support through his advisors and, accordingly, crisis management would not be enhanced by establishment at the national level of an elaborate "National Command Center" manned by a large, permanent interagency staff. Many avenues are available that would improve interagency effectiveness in crisis anticipation and management. The following are recommended: increased attention at all levels of the Joint Staff with crisis management, freer interaction at all levels between members of the Joint Staff and their counterparts in other agencies, greater interagency review of military and political contingency plans, increased inter-agency participation in war gaming and exercising, and increased attention within the Joint Staff on nonmilitary factors affecting crisis anticipation and management. Within the military establishment the concept of handling crises within command posts or operations centers is well established. The NMCC is similar to, but both narrower and broader in its scope than the conventional operations center. It is narrower in that its support to decision makers is rendered through the medium of their staff advisors, and ordinarily it does not itself provide advisory staff support except when an emergency does not permit referral to such advisors. It is broader in that the principal users of NMCC information support are not only the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Joint Staff, but also various elements of OSD and authorized persons in the White House, State Department and CIA. The NMCC performs the functions of (1) warning and alert, (2) information support, and (3) implementation. Its principal suppliers of information to the NMCC are the operating forces, the service operations centers, and the DIA through the Intelligence Support and Indications Center. The fundamental character of the NMCC is that of a DoD information support facility operated by the Joint Chiefs of Staff for the DoD as a whole. In the performance of its functions the NMCC should exchange information freely with analogous information centers elsewhere within the Government. The management arrangements under which the NMCC operates should preserve its close working relationship with the Directorate for Operations in the Joint Staff and also should reflect its essentially informational character and DoD-wide scope. Future development of the NMCC should emphasize evolutionary improvement as opposed to sweeping change. Such evolution will be helped by increased efforts to evaluate NMCC performances both in actual crises and in exercises. The establishment of suitable performance standards for the NMCC will also be helpful in its development. Exercises of a variety of types and scope are necessary not only for the improvement of the NMCC but also to familiarize participating decision makers with its facilities and with command problems. For some of these exercises, senior members from all affected agencies and their staffs should participate. At any stage of crisis or general nuclear war, enemy options range from a deliberate heavy attack against national command centers to strenuously avoiding these targets. In addition, there are a host of foreseeable and unforeseeable events that could lead to nuclear strikes on Washington or to Washington remaining completely undamaged. In providing for command and control support to the President, all of these contingencies must be considered. In providing survivability for the President, the worst cases must be planned for. There are many factors militating against presidential relocation during crises short of general war. However, if the enemy decides to escalate a crisis to general war, he can easily destroy unprotected national centers without the President's receiving tactical warning. If tactical warning of an attack is received, it is not clear that the President's wisest course would be to seek immediate protection. Accordingly, capabilities should be provided for presidential protection in a highly survivable command center during any phase of crisis. This center must allow the President and the Presidential Group to manage intense crises short of general nuclear war as well as these can be managed from the White House. The unique value of the President required that all possible measures be taken to insure his personal survival of an attack on the U.S. However, provision for a successor is also necessary. Accordingly, capabilities should allow relocation to a highly survivable center of an alternate Presidential Group headed by a presidentially designated alternate Commander-in-Chief. The command and control support for this alternate group could be much more austere than those for a relocated President. It is important to recognize the national-level character of those alternates that might be used by the President or an Alternate Decision Group as contrasted with the DoD-level role of the NMCC. A DUCC in Washington would be the only facility that could adequately satisfy the presidential needs for accessibility combined with survivability and adequate staff support. However, since a DUCC cannot be operational for at least five years, in the interim only the NECPA ship and a National Mobile Land Command Post (NMLCP) come close to approximating the requirements of: adequate staff support; high volume (not necessarily survivable) communications between the alternate and soft Washington centers; continuous operation for a period of days or weeks; and high survivability of the alternate itself. The NEACP falls short of meeting the first three criteria: the ANMCC fails on the last. For the time period before a DUCC could be operational, the study developed the following three different configurations of alternates ranging from most austere to the most adequate: a. Two functionally similar NECPA ships b. Three NEACP aircraft, plus (a) above c. An NMLCP with a staff capacity somewhat less than an NECPA, plus (b) above. The Study recommends alternative (b) above. An NMLCP is not recommended unless greater emphasis is placed on providing flexible capabilities for presidential relocation during intense crises short of general war. The JCS assisted by DCA and the Navy should conduct a study that develops plans for remedying the operational defects of the current two-ship NECPA element. This study should: i) detail the functional needs and criteria for support of the Presidential Group during intense crises and during the strategic exchange phase; ii) compare the costs and schedules of significantly improving the Northampton or obtaining a replacement hull; and, iii) consider operating concepts with the current or new ships. The operational concept and support plans of the NECPA and the NEACP should be revised to provide for greater endurance, survivability and accessibility. For the NECPA, this planning should include increased protection from various forms of attack, larger and faster transportation capability between Washington and the ships, and operations closer to the Washington area during crises. For the NEACP, the planning should include use of aerial refueling, permanent dispersal of the aircraft, capability for post-strike use of several bases that have prelocated logistics and communications support, and plans for locating the aircraft closer to Washington during severe crises. Because of its relatively low survivability, the ANMCC is not suited to use by the President or an Alternate Decision Group during an intense crisis or the initial stages of a general war. The AJCC should be continued with primarily the following functions: act as a potential reconstitution site in the follow-on phases of a general war; provide a dispersed back-up to Washington communications; and support other NMCS centers for day-to-day operations and crises. A detailed functional and technical analysis of the current and planned AJCC should be conducted in order to develop a better understanding of how particular capabilities and costs contribute to each of these functions. The study should indicate potential savings. Source: http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/frus/johnsonlb/x/9058.htm 89. Memorandum From R.C. Bowman of the National Security Council Staff to the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council (Smith) /1/ /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Agency File, JCS, Filed by the LBJ Library, Box 29. Top Secret. Washington, May 24, 1965. SUBJECT National Command System I have attached two JCS papers that you might like to scan. I have not heard any more about the command system study since I spoke to you about it in February. JCSM 129/2/ indicates the Chiefs' general agreement with the study with the exception that they felt it underrates the Alternate Command Center at Fort Ritchie. At that time the Chiefs deferred judgment on the Command Post Afloat. /2/JCSM-129-65, February 26, "Conceptual Approach to the National Military Command System"; not printed. In the second paper, JCSM 364 (17 May),/3/ they concluded that two command ships are essential, and that the capabilities of the USS Northampton should be improved. The Chief of Naval Operations disagreed, and argued that one ship was sufficient. /3/JCSM-364-65, "National Emergency Command Post Afloat"; not printed. In the last analysis, the value of any command facility must be determined to a great extent by the probability that the President will, in fact, make use of that facility. RCB/4/ /4/A typed note under Bowman's initials reads: "Please return." Bowman wrote a note at the bottom of the page: "It is long overdue that we take a positive hand in this &amp; some other related command control matters. RCB" Source: http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/frus/johnsonlb/x/9059.htm 92. Letter From Secretary of State Rusk to the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Vance) /1/ /1/Source: Washington National Records Center, OSD Files: FRC 330 70 A 1265, 031.1 White House (23 Jan 65). Secret. Washington, September 3, 1965. Dear Cy: The Department of Defense study, Command and Control Support to the President, transmitted with your letter of March 6, 1965,/2/ contributes significantly to the development of a comprehensive Executive Branch approach to crisis management. The President's command and control support requirements are of obvious concern to the Department of State and to me personally. /2/For the conclusion of the study, see Document 86 . The letter of March 6 was not found. I am of the personal view that much of the prevailing thinking about the problems of conducting essential governmental processes after sustaining a nuclear attack is inadequate and dated and fails to grapple realistically with the formidable obstacles which would confront officials surviving such an encounter. Of necessity, this basic reservation colors and qualifies some of the comments which follow. Many of the observations and recommendations contained in this study confirm the validity of present State/Defense understandings and arrangements which have enhanced the President's ability to give direction to politico-military operations. I have in mind particularly the exchange of personnel between our Operations Center and the National Military Command Center, the monitoring by one department of the other's significant message traffic, and other machinery for managing crisis situations at the Presidential level. Moreover, the study emphasizes the value of such activities as the recently inaugurated State-Defense-CIA cooperation in politico-military contingency planning and in the development and conduct of major JCS exercises. We also note that the current study reinforces the previously advanced justification for the construction of a Deep Underground Command Center (DUCC). The National Military Command System's Master Plan and the JCS Continuity of Operations Plan/3/ contemplate State Department representation in both the sea and airborne alternates, as well as the ANMCC. We will give further study to operational concepts and physical arrangements applicable to State Department functions both at and in support of such command posts. /3/Neither further identified. Under its terms of reference, the DOD study group was instructed to state projections of Presidential support obtainable from non-DOD sources in "general terms" only. We concur in the view that a Presidentially directed response to varying crisis levels, up to and including general war, requires the marshalling of a wider range of governmental resources than those of the Department of Defense. Hence we believe that there is a need to explore more specifically the conceptual requirements for non-DOD command and control support to the President which will supplement the analysis of Department of Defense support developed by the DOD study group. Initially, such an undertaking would appear to call for a careful stock-taking by other key agencies of their own responsibilities and capabilities in this field. The Department of State, accordingly, will initiate a study along these lines at an early date. We hope such a study will contribute to government-wide understanding of the components of a total "national command" concept. We shall be giving study to improving our own Command and Control System in the days ahead. Undoubtedly this work will include consultations between our respective Departments and joint consideration of pertinent materials, including the present study. If this exercise results in additional suggestions or proposals which might be worth your consideration in connection with review of command and control procedures, we will be in communication with you. With warm regards, Sincerely, Dean Source: http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/frus/johnsonlb/x/9064.htm 164. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense McNamara /1/ /1/Source: Washington National Records Center, OSD Files: FRC 330 72 A 2468, 381 Cont of Govt Ops 1967. Secret. A stamped notation on the memorandum reads: "Sec Def has seen Brief." JCSM-812-66 Washington, January 3, 1967. SUBJECT Planning for Improving Survivability of the National Command Authorities (U) 1. (U) Reference is made to: a. DOD Directive S-5100.30, dated 16 October 1962, subject: "Concept of Operations of the World-Wide Military Command and Control System."2 b. DOD Directive S-5100.44, dated 9 June 1964, subject: "Master Plan for the National Military Command System."/2/ /2/Not found. c. JCSM-103-64, dated 25 February 1964, subject: "The Continuity of Operations Plan for the Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (COOP-OJCS) (U)."/3/ /3/A copy is in the National Archives and Records Administration, RG 218, JCS Files, 3180 (28 Jan 64) Sec 1 IR 337. 2. (S) The references provide the concept and plans to insure the survivability of a command and control system and the necessary staff personnel to support the National Command Authorities (NCA) in the strategic direction of US military forces throughout the entire spectrum of cold, limited, and general war. Currently, there is no adequate plan to insure the survivability of the NCA or their authorized successors. The Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that a credible policy of controlled response requires that such a plan be prepared. Therefore, the plan outlined herein is submitted for your consideration and recommendation to the President. 3. (S) As reflected in reference 1c, present continuity planning by the Joint Chiefs of Staff provides the necessary flexibility to adapt to whatever relocation action the President may select in an emergency. However, there is no assurance that such relocation action will be initiated in sufficient time nor, if initiated in time, that it would ensure survival of the present NCA. Therefore, the Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that a plan should be developed to disperse designated successors to the NCA to existing facilities of the National Military Command System (NMCS) in the following manner: a. Based on the established line of succession to the individual offices comprising the NCA, the following three groups of alternate NCA should be designated: 3 paragraphs (20 lines of source text) not declassified ] b. The proposed alternate command groups have been kept small to improve their mobility. However, provision would be made for one or two individuals to accompany each member of the groups, if desired. For example, the Deputy Secretary of Defense has not been included in any of the groups in this concept in the event you desire that he accompany you. c. According to the situation and Presidential desire, the groups of alternate NCA would relocate during a crisis escalation, one to each of the three alternate command centers of the NMCS. Command center communications would permit participation of the relocated groups in national deliberations. 1 paragraph (8-1/2 lines of source text) not declassified ] 4. (S) The Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that specific procedures should be established to execute this plan as a means of preventing all legal successors to the NCA, and their key advisors, from becoming casualties at the same time. Timely dispersal of designated persons in line of succession to the NCA to the alternate command centers of the NMCS is believed to be the best method for assuring that recognized NCA are available for direction of military operations. The persons designated by law as successors to the NCA should be briefed on the plan and made familiar with its procedures. 5. (U) The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that a memorandum substantially the same as that contained in the Appendix hereto,/4/ which advocates the development of such a plan, be forwarded to the President, subject to the concurrence of the Secretary of State and the Director of the Office of Emergency Planning. /4/Not printed. For the Joint Chiefs of Staff: Earle G. Wheeler Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff Source: http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/frus/johnsonlb/x/9061.htm 110. Editorial Note Despite initial opposition from the Joint Chiefs of Staff, during 1964 and 1965 the civilian leadership in the Department of Defense proceeded to develop plans for the construction of a Deep Underground Command Center (DUCC) in the Washington, D.C., area and continued to ask the Joint Chiefs of Staff for their views. Regarding this internal debate and the evolving plans on this issue, see Documents 3 , 4 , 52 , 77 , and 92 . The Department of Defense also promoted this project in Congress, and included funds for further research on the specific size, operations, and functions and for its construction in the Army's portion of the military construction authorization bills in early 1964. Aware of the Joint Chiefs of Staff's reservations and believing the issues were too complex and sensitive, the House Armed Services Committee did not approve funds for the Deep Underground Command Center but instead created a special subcommittee to study the issue thoroughly. (Memorandum from Deputy Director of Defense Research and Engineering Eugene G. Fubini to Deputy Secretary Vance, February 25, 1964; Washington National Records Center, OSD Files: FRC 330 70 A 4662, 381 DUCC (10 Jan 64) 1963 and 64 Papers) The appropriations for FY 1965 as enacted by the Congress did not include funds for construction or research for this facility, and the chairmen of key Congressional committees also rejected the Department of Defense proposal to use other authorized funds for feasibility studies. (Letters from Vance to Representative George H. Mahon, September 30, 1964, and to Senator Carl Vinson, October 1, 1964; letter from Vinson to Vance, October 1, 1964; letter from Mahon to Vance, October 6, 1964; and letter from Senator Carl Hayden to McNamara, October 9, 1964; all ibid.) The Department of Defense deferred action temporarily (letter from Vance to Vinson, October 9; ibid.) but continued to study the cost and configuration of the proposed facility. In early 1965, for instance, the Office of the Director of Defense Research and Engineering made tentative recommendations for possible sites. (Memorandum from James M. Bridges, Special Assistant (Command and Control), to Harold Brown, March 4, 1965; ibid., 381 1966) A large map of the Washington, D.C., area outlining proposed layouts for the DUCC, and a table comparing tunnel length for two DUCC configurations are attached to a March 8 memorandum to Brown. (Ibid.) The House Armed Services Committee reduced the Defense Department's FY 1966 request for $26.2 million for the DUCC to $6 million, which would permit the Pentagon "to more fully develop plans and to again present the actual construction authorization request" next year. (Letter from Congressman L. Mendel Rivers to McNamara, May 25; ibid.; FRC 330 70 A 4443, 381 DUCC (10 Jan 66) 1965 &amp; 1966 Papers) In its response, the Department of Defense informed the House Committee that it proposed, among other things, to dig one shaft to "advance both the design and construction time and permit research and development efforts associated with the rock properties at the site to proceed concurrently. This would permit us to obtain early verification of our current estimates of subsurface rock conditions (based on preliminary test drillings) which have a direct bearing upon the cost and technical problems associated with the major construction of entrance and exit tunnels and the main underground facility." (Letter from Assistant Secretary of Defense (Installations and Logistics) Paul R. Ignatius to Rivers, June 14; ibid.) Nevertheless, the Department of Defense's interest in the project gradually waned. When, for example, the Joint Chiefs of Staff proposed to obtain, among other things, the President's views "as to the nonmilitary functional and personnel requirements of those departments and agencies of the National Government" to be provided for in the DUCC, they were much later informed that no response would be made to their proposal. (JCSM-985-64 to Secretary McNamara, November 27, 1964, and memorandum from Maurice W. Roche to the JCS, August 10, 1965; both ibid., FRC 330 70 A 4662, 381 1966) Moreover, Congress authorized only $4 million for this project in FY 1966, and letters from four Committee Chairmen told the Defense Department "not to go ahead with any designs without Congressional approval." (Memorandum from Assistant Secretary of Defense Robert N. Anthony to McNamara, February 16, 1966; ibid., FRC 330 70 A 4443, 381 DUCC (10 Jan 66) 1965 &amp; 1966 Papers) Although McNamara had earlier approved an FY 1967 request to Congress for $21,898,000 for the DUCC, he expressed "doubt that we should proceed to spend $4 million until after Congress acts on '67" (handwritten note to Ignatius, February 18, on Anthony's February 16 memorandum), and he shortly decided not to seek Congressional clearance for continued planning for the DUCC project and agreed to divert the Army specialists engaged on the DUCC to other military construction projects. (Handwritten notation, March 3, on Ignatius' memorandum to McNamara, February 25; ibid.) Congress again failed to provide funding for the Deep Underground Command Center in the Department of Defense budget for FY 1966, but Vance agreed to ask the Congress to authorize FY 1967 funds for early initiation of work on the facility. (Memorandum from Ignatius to Vance, April 15, and unsigned April 15 note from Vance's office to Ignatius; both ibid., FRC 330 70 A 4662, 381 1966) Nothing seemed to come of this initiative, however, and no later documentation on the Deep Underground Command Center has been found. http://cryptome.org/dunmcc.htm &lt;&lt; &lt; (2/4) &gt; &gt;&gt; worcesteradam : raven rock is a big underground base GoatsHead : Quote from: worcesteradam on September 11, 2011, 06:35:23 PM raven rock is a big underground base Raven Rock, also known as "Site R" is a continuity of government bunker in Pennsylvania. It was built to facilitate top US government officials (including the president and VP) in the event of a nuclear war or other cataclysmic disaster. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Raven_Rock,_Pennsylvania The existence of Raven Rock is hardly a secret. It is a very mundane VIP bunker. There are no aliens or UFO's inside the facility either. Unlike the real DUMB sites. worcesteradam : whatever you say global_fiefdom : Quote from: GoatsHead on September 11, 2011, 09:32:20 PM Raven Rock, also known as "Site R" is a continuity of government bunker in Pennsylvania. It was built to facilitate top US government officials (including the president and VP) in the event of a nuclear war or other cataclysmic disaster. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Raven_Rock,_Pennsylvania The existence of Raven Rock is hardly a secret. It is a very mundane VIP bunker. There are no aliens or UFO's inside the facility either. Unlike the real DUMB sites. Mundane? please! Quote History Planning for the site began in 1948. After the Soviet Union detonated its first nuclear weapon in 1949, a high priority was established for the Joint Command Post to be placed in a protected location near Washington, D.C., for swift relocation of the National Command Authorities and the Joint Communications Service. The selected site is near Camp David (then known as "Shangri-La"). In 1950, President Harry S Truman approved making Raven Rock part of Camp Albert Ritchie, Maryland. This new site was named the Alternate Joint Communications Center (AJCC) Site R. Construction of the facility began in 1951, and in 1953 it became operational. In 1977, the Department of Defense created the Special Projects Office (later to become the Protective Design Center) to work on the classified Alternate National Military Command and Control Center Improvement Program, which sought to design a deep-underground, hardened command and control center. The plans envisioned separate structures for command personnel, power, fuel, and water; more than three miles (5 km) of air entrainment tunnels; and access shafts to the surface. The program was cancelled in 1979. The RRMC was one of the "undisclosed locations" frequently used by Vice President Dick Cheney following the September 11 attacks. http://cryptome.org/eyeball/site-r/site-r.htm http://www.thewatcherfiles.com/dumb.htm http://www.detrick.army.mil/emo/FORT_DETRICK_AREA_B_EA_24DEC2010.pdf Quote 2.0 DESCRIPTION OF THE PROPOSED ACTION The Proposed Action and subject of this EA is the Construction and Operation of Proposed Projects, which include a Department of Homeland Security Antenna, RV Parking Lot, Training Campus and Infrastructure Improvements, on Area B of Fort Detrick in Frederick County, Maryland. Section 2.1 details the planned construction activities for the Proposed Action (see Figure 2-1), and Section 2.2 briefly summarizes the Conceptual Projects which are not part of the Proposed Action. Descriptions of projects outside the Proposed Action are intended to provide a meaningful estimate of future baseline conditions, such that the collective environmental impacts (i.e., cumulative impacts) of all the projects can be determined. Section 2.3 discusses regulatory and permitting requirements for mitigation of potential environmental impacts during construction. Section 2.4 presents the routine operational activities for the Proposed Action, including utility requirements and regulatory and permitting requirements for mitigation of potential environmental impacts during that phase of the Proposed Action. Section 2.5 discusses future sustainability requirements for Federal facilities. 2.1 PROPOSED PROJECTS Antenna for DHS (Proposed Project) This project is being evaluated in this EA for its potential environmental impacts. The DHS will install a new HF antenna on the northern portion Area B. Fort Detrick has been supporting DHS Science and Technology (S&amp;T) since 2004. In 2005, the DHS S&amp;T facility was completed on Area A. In September 2005, the Real Property Planning Board (RPPB) authorized a DHS radio transmitter facility along with two antenna sites. HF radios are required for DHS communications and compatibility with existing DHS and other communications networks (DHS, 2010). Two HF antennas were located on Area B, (a conical monopole and a log periodic). After evaluation for serviceability, the conical monopole was retained and the log periodic antenna was removed. DHS completed the installation of one HF radio system in May 2010 and a second HF transmitter was installed in fall 2010. An antenna is required for the second system to become functional. The proposed antenna will be located at an existing antenna pad. It will provide DHS with a multiple antenna capability and will be approximately 36 feet (ft) tall (DHS, 2010; Polley, 2010a). 2.2 CONCEPTUAL PROJECTS Conceptual projects at Fort Detrick are those which are currently under study and will be addressed in more detail in future NEPA documentation. There are three conceptual projects for Area B which includes the construction and operation of a city road easement, family morale, welfare, and recreation (FMWR) facilities, and a Photovoltaic Array. Area B Photovoltaic Array (Conceptual Project) A photovoltaic array totaling approximately 20 acres will be constructed on Area B. The exact location is undecided but may be built partially over landfills which have limited uses; therefore, construction of the photovoltaic array will maximize the land in a cost-effective manner. The solar panels will provide Fort Detrick with an environmentally friendly source of electricity that will reduce the carbon dioxide emissions from the Installation. The entire installation will benefit from the renewable, secure supply of clean energy that the photovoltaic array would provide. http://www.mnn.com/earth-matters/wilderness-resources/photos/best-us-places-to-survive-the-apocalypse/site-r http://www.abovetopsecret.com/forum/thread288544/pg1 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Raven_Rock_Mountain_Complex http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mount_Weather_Emergency_Operations_Center The Raven Rock Mountain Complex (RRMC) is a United States government facility on Raven Rock, a mountain in the U.S. state of Pennsylvania. It is located in Liberty Township, Adams County, about 14 km (8.7 mi) east of Waynesboro, Pennsylvania, and 10 km (6.2 mi) north-northeast of Camp David, Maryland. It is also called the Raven Rock Military Complex, or simply Site R. Other designations and nicknames include "The Rock", NMCC-R (National Military Command Center Reservation), ANMCC (Alternate National Military Command Center), AJCC (Alternate Joint Communications Center), "Backup Pentagon", or "Site RT"; the latter refers to the vast array of communication towers and equipment atop the mountain. Colloquially, the facility is known as an "underground Pentagon". The facility runs more than 38 communications systems for its users. The Defense Information Systems Agency computer operations staff provides computer services to the National Command Authority, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Office of the Secretary of Defense and other United States Department of Defense agencies. Its largest tenant is the Defense Threat Reduction Agency. RRMC also houses the emergency operations centers for the Army, Navy and Air Force. _________________ Looking Glass (or Operation Looking Glass) is the code name for an airborne command center currently operated by the U.S. Navy. It provides command and control of U.S. nuclear forces in the event that ground-based command centers are destroyed or otherwise rendered inoperable. The Looking Glass was initiated by the U.S. Air Force's Strategic Air Command in 1961 and operated by the 34th Air Refueling Squadron, Offutt AFB, Nebraska. In August 1966 the mission transferred to the 38th Strategic Reconnaissance Squadron, the 2d Airborne Command and Control Squadron in April 1970, to the 7th Airborne Command and Control Squadron in October 1988, and to the U.S. Navy in 1994. The airborne command post is referred to as Looking Glass because its mission "mirrors" ground-based command, control, and communications located at the USSTRATCOM Global Operations Center (GOC) at Offutt Air Force Base. It has also been called the "Doomsday Plane," since its role would only be necessary in the event that the ground nuclear command centers at Offutt, the National Military Command Center, and Site R were destroyed. The Looking Glass is equipped with the Airborne Launch Control System, capable of transmitting launch commands to US ground-based ICBMs in the event that the ground launch control centers are rendered inoperable. At DEFCON 2 or higher, the Looking Glass pilot and co-pilot were both required to wear an eye patch, retrieved from their Emergency War Order (EWO) kit. In the event of a surprise blinding flash from a nuclear detonation, the eye patch would prevent blindness in the covered eye, thus enabling them to see in at least one eye and continue flying. Later, the eye patch was replaced by goggles that would instantaneously turn opaque when exposed to a nuclear flash, then rapidly clear for normal vision. _________________________________ DIA There are several conspiracy theories relating to the airport's design and construction. Murals painted in the baggage claim area have been claimed to contain themes referring to future military oppression and a one-world government. However, the artist, Leo Tanguma, said the murals, entitled "In Peace and Harmony With Nature" and "The Children of the World Dream of Peace," depict man-made environmental destruction and genocide along with humanity coming together to heal nature and live in peace. In the mid-1990s, Philip Schneider gave lectures about highly secretive government information concerning "deep underground military bases" that were constructed by the United States government, and said that one of these bases exists underneath the Denver International Airport. Author Alex Christopher claimed to have worked in the tunnels under the airport, and described what appeared to be vast holding areas for prisoners, strange nausea-inducing electromagnetic forces, and caverns big enough to drive trucks through, presumably to be filled with helpless political prisoners. This theory has been challenged, since photos have revealed that these tunnels are used for transportation of baggage by way of conveyor belts People have found out that there have been unusual markings in the terminals in DIA and have recorded them as masonic markings. Conspiracists have pointed to unusual words cut into the floor as being Satanic, Masonic, or just some impenetrable secret code of the New World Order: Cochetopa, Sisnaajini, and the baffling Dzit Dit Gaii. These words are actually Navajo terms for geographical sites in Colorado. "Braaksma" and "Villarreal" are actually the names of Carolyn Braaksma and Mark Villarreal, artists who worked on the airport's sculptures and paintings. There is a dedication marker in the airport inscribed with the Square and Compasses of the Freemasons, along with a listing of the two Grand Lodges of Freemasonry in Colorado. It is mounted over a time capsule that was sealed during the dedication of the airport. The Freemasons participated in laying this "capstone" (the last, finishing stone) of the airport project. The capstone also is inscribed with a line that simply states "New World Airport Commission". 9/11-insider trading : Bin Laden has them everywhere. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FGhGHxw0mSo http://forum.prisonplanet.com/index.php?topic=216786.5;wap2 Deep Underground Command Centers http://www.scribd.com/doc/113693833/Deep-Underground-Command-Centers http://www.liveleak.com/view?i=8d7_1362421532 Nuclear Fire Deep Underground National Military Command Center Documents Raven Rock, Deep Underground Command Centers, DUMBs, US Military, Elite, Pentagon Mon, 25 Apr 2011 15:35:14 -0400 http://www.liveleak.com/view?i=5ee_1303759207 e4bannan Flimsy corrugated sheathed plywood boxes with cheap interiors of fake paneling, shag carpet, and all the aerodynamics of a brick will keep you in the lap of luxury on all your cross country safaris. http://www.liveleak.com/view?i=5ee_1303759207 e4bannan Escape to <span class="highlight">Shangri-La</span> with your brand new 1973 Tenement-on-Wheels motor home,get-away,vacation,tenement on wheels Wed, 10 Oct 2012 13:05:33 -0400 http://www.liveleak.com/view?i=875_1349888534 MrFailAlot so here the veilling scenery i recorded ... Elena Siegman - Pareidolia ( Black Ops Shangri-La Zombie Theme ) http://www.liveleak.com/view?i=875_1349888534 MrFailAlot scenery Veilling ( part of shout out list part 2 ) mrfailalot Veilling Aalsmeer elena siegman pareidolia Wed, 26 Sep 2012 04:41:55 -0400 http://www.liveleak.com/view?i=3ab_1348648172 tubezzz Shangri-La, Yunnan, China. (comment about next video:) My friend and I encountered this for the first time yesterday at a big frozen pond in the Adirondacks and this is the video that comes closest to what we heard there! We were mesmerized! What causes this wonderful noise-the water moving below and the ice constantly shifting and changing? I tried to get some http://www.liveleak.com/view?i=3ab_1348648172 tubezzz More cracking ice sounds - for all you sceptics melting, cracking ice Wed, 11 Jul 2012 13:19:11 -0400 http://www.liveleak.com/view?i=480_1342027011 MB-UK Japan has summoned the Chinese ambassador in Tokyo to protest the alleged violation of its waters near disputed islands at the centre of a heated territorial dispute. Cheng Yonghua, the Chinese ambassador to Japan, was summoned to the foreign ministry in Tokyo on Wednesday and informed by Kenichiro Sasae, the vice foreign minister, that the violation of Japanese territorial waters is "extremely serious" and "unacceptable." A few hours later, Liu Weimin, a spokesman for the Chinese Foreign Ministry in Beijing, dismissed the rebuke and said Japan had no grounds to file a complaint. He reiterated that the five rocky islands that make up the chain, known in China as the Diaoyu Islands, are sovereign Chinese territory. He added that the Chinese ships were "performing patrolling operations in waters administered by China". The incident is one of the most serious confrontations since September 2010, when a Chinese fisherman deliberately rammed a Japan Coast Guard vessel after being caught operating illegally in waters around the disputed islands. The latest confrontation has clouded a meeting between the foreign ministers of the two nations at the ASEAN conference in Cambodia. Before sitting down to talks with Yang Jiechi, his Chinese counterpart, Koichiro Gemba, the Japanese foreign minister, said: "Through specific co-operation, we have to make Japan-China relations forward-looking. "But at the same time, I would today like to exchange views frankly on some problems that exist between the two countries." Japan claims that the rocky outcrops, to the west of the southernmost Japanese prefecture of Okinawa, are sovereign Japanese territory and the government last week announced a plan to purchase one of the islands from its owner, a private citizen whose family used to carry out fishing operations from the islands. Both China and Taiwan also claim the islands as their territory and there have been periodic clashes between the Japan Coast Guard and protesters trying to land on the islands and plant the Chinese or Taiwanese flags. Japan's position is that neither nation laid legal claim to the remote islands until the 1970s, when significant deposits of oil and natural gas were located beneath the seabed close to the islands. There is growing concern in the western Pacific as China has similarly laid claim to islands and shoals in the South China Sea, bringing Beijing into confrontation with Vietnam, Brunei and the Philippines. In June, the US announced that it will shift the majority of its naval fleet from the Atlantic to the Pacific by 2020. The transfer reflects a new strategic focus on Asia, Pentagon chief Leon Panetta told the Shangri-La Dialogue of defence officials from 27 nations across Asia and the Pacific in Singapore. Mr Panetta insisted that the shift in strategy is not a challenge to China but merely a move compatible with the development and growth of the fast-growing Asian power.---- Source: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/japan/9391842/Japan-summons-Chinas-ambassador-over-islands-dispute.html http://www.liveleak.com/view?i=480_1342027011 MB-UK Japan summons China's ambassador over islands dispute japan, china, ambassador, islands, dispute Fri, 01 Jun 2012 02:47:25 -0400 http://www.liveleak.com/view?i=10e_1338532964 MB-UK In the absence of a formal defence alliance like Nato, the annual Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore has become the pre-eminent annual security gathering in the Asia-Pacific region. According to Dr John Chipman, the director-general and chief executive of the International Institute for Strategic Studies, who organise the gathering, "the Shangri-La Dialogue is now commonly referred to as the 'indispensable forum' for Asian defence diplomacy." This year defence ministers and senior officials from some 27 countries are gathering in Singapore. The US defence secretary is a regular participant as too are senior officials from China, Australia, Japan, Canada, India, Indonesia and a host of smaller Asian countries. One of the great benefits of this gathering is that unlike a formal summit there is no communiqu'e to be worked on. The plenary sessions are often used by ministers to launch trial balloons or make new policy pronouncements and, John Chipman asserts, "the event as a whole allows the defence establishments to 'take the pulse' of the prevailing mood in the region". To old disputes like the tensions between China and Taiwan or those between North and South Korea can be added a host of new problems, many of them focused on the competition for natural resources in the South China Sea. Recent weeks, for example, have seen serious tensions between China and the Philippines. Living with a rising and sometimes more assertive China is a perennial theme at these gatherings. But, as Dr Chipman said, this year events in China itself give the discussion an added dimension. "Given the leadership transition in China, it is hard to predict how other ministers will address the China question during this summit. There is bound to be a great deal of discussion about the South China Sea," he said. The bubbling Korean crisis too is bound to figure. The North has stepped up its rhetorical assaults on the South and has threatened to conduct a new, third, nuclear test. Dr Chipman notes that the situation on the Korean Peninsula is so delicate now that most of the debate on this at the dialogue will be in private rather than in public. Of course strong economies combined with the perception of growing threats mean that more money is being spent on weaponry and defence equipment. China itself has deployed its first trial aircraft carrier, it has developed a stealth fighter, it is expanding both its navy and its civilian maritime patrol force and it has begun to deploy a ballistic missile capable, potentially, of striking at US aircraft carriers far out at sea. Other countries are responding by beefing up their own air and maritime forces - submarines and maritime patrol aircraft are a popular option. India is modernising its air force and developing a capability to launch ballistic missiles from submarines. There are also hopes in some quarters that the US will begin to deploy new naval assets of its own to bases in the region, like the ultra-modern Littoral Combat Ships. Inevitably, says Dr Chipman, this is all going to colour much of the discussion in Singapore. "With defence expenditure in Asia rising above that in Europe this year there is bound to be a debate about whether this is all about modernisation or significantly about competition." "Most Asians are keen on a multipolar Asia, and fear that China likes multipolarity on the global level but is less keen on it in the region," he said. "Equally, many are worried that if the US gets the tone and content of its policy wrong then there could be unnecessary US-China tensions." "The net effect is to impose on Asian middle and rising powers more responsibility for themselves shaping the debate." "Look to Indonesia, Australia and others to try to define the terms of the security debate more forcefully at this year's Shangri-La Dialogue," he said. Two key speeches are likely to set the tone at this year's gathering. The meeting will be opened by Indonesian President Dr Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono. How will he frame the policy challenges in the region and situate Indonesia in the multipolar Asia that is emerging? Equally, the US Defence Secretary Leon Panetta's speech will be closely watched. As the draw-down in Afghanistan begins the Obama administration has announced a US "pivot" back towards Asia. What exactly does this mean in defence terms? Mr Panetta's speech is entitled "US Defence Policy in an Era of Austerity". Does the US have the resources to maintain its interests in the Middle East and elsewhere whilst reaffirming its role as an Asian power? Dr Chipman will be listening as closely as the rest. How, he asks, will Mr Panetta balance reassurance to allies, outreach to new, potential partners and the need for a pragmatic, if hard-headed, defence relationship with China? Watch this space.---- Source: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-18260424 http://www.liveleak.com/view?i=10e_1338532964 MB-UK China factor to dominate top defence summit china, asia, defence Sun, 18 Dec 2011 20:39:38 -0500 http://www.liveleak.com/view?i=169_1324256639 BOMBBOMBIRAN On November 12 , 1945, Life Magazine ran an unusual story. It was a photographic study of an FBI agent named Jelly Bryce drawing and firing his .357 Magnum in two-fifths of a second, faster than the human eye can follow. In the pictures Bryce dropped a silver dollar from shoulder height with his right hand then drew with the same hand and shot the coin before it reached his waist. What the article did not say was that Bryce could not only draw fast in front of a camera, but also in front of people who were trying to kill him. In fact, at that time, Bryce had already killed over 10 men in face-to-face shootouts as a city policeman and FBI Agent. In his era Bryce was undoubtedly the FBI's deadliest gun and may have been the best they ever had. To paraphrase Butch Cassidy and the Sundance Kid: who was this guy? D.A. Bryce was born in 1906 in Mt. View, Oklahoma, a small town in southwest Oklahoma. There was a story that went around in later years that baby Bryce had been allowed to teethe on his daddy's pistol and had thereby imbibed some of his later ability with hand guns, a tall tale,obviously. Not so, says Bryce's sister, Lila Dawson. "When he was a baby they let him teethe on Daddy's unloaded pistol. They propped him up with pillows there in the crib and let him go after it." By the time of his retirement in 1958 Bryce had become so legendary among lawmen of the Southwest that a lot of apocryphal stories about him floated around, a surprising number of which turn out to be true. Two things about Bryce's childhood are certain: he was recognized early on as a prodigy with firearms and he was encouraged by those around him. In particular he was encouraged by a doting grandfather who furnished him with shotgun shells and Bryce himself once managed to save over a hundred dollars shining shoes which he then invested in ammunition. And in those days a hundred dollars would buy a barn-load of ammunition. In short, he practiced a lot, but there was more going on there than just practice. Bryce was born with an astonishing natural talent. When Leah Rhymer met Bryce he was ten years old and owned a little .22 rifle he used for hunting rabbits and shooting tin cans. "And," she says, "he never missed." Never? "No. Never. He was a perfect shot." Bryce was the only kid that age she ever knew who had his own rifle and was allowed to use it unsupervised. He also had an air rifle he got a lot of mileage out of in town. He was seldom without one or the other. "He really just grew up down on the creek bank with a rifle in his hand," his niece, D.A. Dawson says. In those days the army would hold something called a citizen's military camp and, after graduating from high school, Bryce attended one at Ft. Sill, Oklahoma along with several hundred other young men. While there he won first in pistol, first in rifle, and then went on to win the national rifle competition at Camp Perry in Ohio. SHOOTING MATCH Out of high school, it was time to think about the future and gainful employment. More than anything in the world Bryce loved hunting and fishing so later that summer he became a state game ranger in Oklahoma. Apparently he grew restless with that, though, because after only six months he resigned and embarked for the University of Oklahoma where he planned to enroll. While en route he caught wind of a pistol contest where they were offering a hundred dollars in gold as first prize. That got his attention fast. The contest was in Shawnee, Oklahoma and was being held as part of the annual Oklahoma Sheriff's and Peace Officers convention. Bryce drove down, found the firing range, got out of his car and approached Clarence Hurt, then the Night Chief of Police and a member of the Oklahoma City pistol team. "This contest open to anybody?" Bryce asked. "You think you can shoot, huh?" Hurt said, eyeing him skeptically. "I think I can, yes," Bryce said. Hurt thought the whole thing kind of flaky, this Joe College in white slacks and a sweater approaching him out of the blue and besides that he was shooting an old smooth-bore .38 that was practically an antique. But the Oklahoma City pistol team didn't have much chance of winning that day and Hurt, their best shot, badly wanted his team to win. And who knew? Maybe this kid would be a decent shot. Hurt led him behind a nearby hill to see what he could do. "What do you want me to shoot?" Hurt took out an old envelope and stuck it in the cleft of a tree trunk and walked off the regulation distance. "Shoot that." "Can I draw and shoot? I'm better if I draw first than just stand still." "Up to you." Bryce drew and put six fast shots into an area the size of a silver dollar. Clarence Hurt, for once in his life almost speechless, could only say, "You are now a member of the Oklahoma City Police Department." Bryce won the hundred dollars in gold that day and the pistol team won, too, largely because of his shooting. More importantly he won a new career. OKLAHOMA CITY POLICEMAN The strangest part of the story, though, was what happened his first couple of days on the job. Bryce told it often in later years and Bob Oswalt, retired FBI, heard it more than once. After reporting for work in Oklahoma City, Bryce, in plain clothes, was leaving a restaurant in downtown Oklahoma City at high noon. Once out on the sidewalk he saw a man sitting in a nearby car that looked suspiciously like a face he had seen on wanted posters in the Oklahoma City area. What's more the man was behaving in a suspicious manner, peering around, acting nervous. Bryce walked over to the car, around to the driver's door, and opened it. The man inside looked up, startled. He had some tools and it looked like he was in the process of trying to start the car without a key. "What are you doing?" Bryce asked. "Who are you?" the man snarled. "A police officer." Without another word the man drew a pistol from under his coat and tried to aim it at Bryce. Before he could fire Bryce drew and killed him. The man slid out of the car onto the cement, dead. The whole thing amazed Bryce. He hadn't expected the guy to draw on him at all. But worse was yet to come. The police were phoned by onlookers and when they arrived Bryce was so new on the force that the captain didn't know him. Worse yet, Bryce hadn't been issued a badge yet. He was summarily arrested for murder and taken to jail. Fortunately Clarence Hurt, who had hired him, showed up that night and turned him loose. "The man is a police officer!" Hurt roared. Bryce was free, but not before his father heard reports of his arrest on the radio news. His father arrived in Oklahoma City that night with a lawyer. Bryce's father was naturally relieved that no charges were going to be filed but still wanted his son to come home to the safety of small town life. Bryce told him, "I've never disobeyed you before but this is what I want to do. I want to be a policeman." To understand Bryces career in Oklahoma City it is necessary to understand the world of the peace officer in the late 20's and early 30's. It was anything but peaceful. In 1924, just three years before Bryce began, Bill Tilghman, last of the great lawmen of the old west, was killed in Cromwell, Oklahoma, while trying to disarm a drunk. When Bryce's career began, the wild west was not a dim memory but a living presence. How wild was it? On New Year's Day, 1934, the Oklahoma City Times joked that the economy was so bad even bank robbery was in a slump. There were only 30 banks robbed in Oklahoma in 1933 as opposed to 59 in 1932. Fifty-nine bank robberies? That's more than one a week. In 1926, Bryce's senior year in highschool, there were 211 homicides in the state. The media was glamorizing bank robbers and criminals and, in a sense, it was open season on police officers; there were nine killed in Oklahoma City just in the decade of the thirties. It was the first hint of the depression, dust bowl and economic upheaval waiting in the wings. One night in 1927 Bryce, alone on night patrol, saw two men in an alley trying to jimmy the back door of a furniture store. He swerved his patrol car into the mouth of the alley, skidding to a stop with his two front lights trained on the two men. He jumped from the car. The two men spun and both opened fire at the same instant. Bryce killed them both instantly with just two shots. What happened next was later told by Clarence Hurt, then still Night Chief of Police in Oklahoma City. He was in his office when Bryce came and asked him to follow him downstairs. Hurt followed Bryce down to his car where he opened the back door and revealed two extremely dead burglars. "What you want me to do with them?" Bryce asked. Hurt, a small, barrel-chested man given to chewing a crooked little pipe, explained, "Take 'em to the morgue, son." Then, in later years when Hurt told the story he would inevitably add, "And you know what that Indian did then? Went home and slept like a baby!" Bryce had killed 3 men his first year, all of them attempting to fire first. On Memorial day, 1933 eleven convicts escaped from the Kansas State Penitentiary in Lansing. One of them, Wilbur Underhill, proceeded to go on a bank robbing spree in a three state area. He was wanted for at least three cold-blooded murders, earning himself the nickname "tri-state terror" in the papers. Underhill was so mean he once killed a drug store employee during a holdup for not raising his hands fast enough. RAID ON UNDERHILL In late December of that year Underhill was spotted by police in south Oklahoma City and tailed back to Shawnee, Oklahoma, a town about forty miles east. A posse of federal and county detectives gathered quickly at the Shawnee police department and hurriedly mapped an attack strategy. The posse included Bryce and his old pal, Clarence Hurt. By then it was dark. A scout car was dispatched to go and drive around the house where Underhill and companions were holed up. It was raining and the night was inky black but the officers reported a light was burning in the house and a drinking party was apparently underway. At three a.m. the police closed in, surrounding the house. The posse, under the direction of R.H. Colvin of the U.S. Investigation Bureau, consisted of six federal agents and eight deputies. About three in the morning Hurt, Bryce and others took up positions at the rear of the house with the remaining officers positioned in the front and along the sides. A light came on in the rear bedroom. The officers approached. Hurt pressed his face against the screen and saw that it was Underhill and his wife. Hurt yelled, "This is the law, Wilbur, stick'em up "Yeah, ok." Underhill said, raising his hands about halfway into the air. Then he suddenly whirled and grabbed two Lugers sitting on the nightstand beside the bed. Underhill and the police opened up at the same instant. Underhill was hit by a fusillade of bullets, knocked down, yet somehow managed to get up and charge out the front of the house through a pelting of gunfire, disappearing into the night. His wife fainted. None of the officers were hurt but they knew Underhill had been seriously wounded, probably mortally. In fact, no one could believe he had managed to run away with so many bullets in him. Bloodhounds were summoned. They followed him. They found three places where he had fallen, full face down, in the mud. A tip soon came in that Underhill was hiding in the back of a furniture store several blocks away, downtown. Hurt, Bryce and the others found him there, in bed, covers pulled up under his chin. He had been gut-shot with a gas gun several times. All the fight had leaked out of him. He surrendered meekly. Too mean to die, he clung to life for several weeks, finally succumbing in the state prison in McAlester, Oklahoma. By 1934 the United States was truly in a crisis of lawlessness. After the Kansas City Massacre the FBI had been given the authority to carry firearms, the problem being they had few people well-trained enough with weapons to battle the more vicious criminals then operating. As one old lawman says, "You know, there's a lot of plain old sorriness around nowadays but, back then, there were some genuinely mean SOB's." Baby Face Nelson had managed to kill two FBI agents in one night in November of 1934, receiving mortal wounds himself in the process. J. Edgar Hoover's FBI went in search of lawmen skilled as "gunslingers." Within 6 months they hired 3 detectives from the Oklahoma City pistol team - Jerry Campbell, Clarence Hurt, the Night Chief, and Oklahoma City's youngest detective, Jelly Bryce. Although Bryce had no college diploma, it was rumored that J. Edgar Hoover's mind was made up by the events surrounding July 18, 1934. OUTLAW HARVEY PUGH In fact, no story about Bryce has been told and retold more times or gained more mythical status among old-time peace officers. Oklahoma City detectives learned that there were three known gangsters holed up at the Wren Hotel at 408 1/2 West Main in Oklahoma City. One was known to be Harvey Pugh, former companion of murderer and cop killer Clyde Barrow. Pugh himself was wanted for the murder of a police officer in McPherson, Kansas. Bryce and two other detectives were dispatched to arrest Pugh and question the other two men. They arrived at the hotel at around 8 a.m. At the front desk was an elderly woman, Nora Bingaman, whose daughter owned the hotel. The officers asked to see the owner, Mrs Merle Bolen, 28 years old. Mrs. Bingaman agreed to take them to her daughter's room. They followed the old lady up the dark stairs and down a dingy hallway to her daughter's room. The old lady knocked perfunctorily and opened the door. But before the detectives could enter the old lady looked startled and tried to step back and pull the door closed again. Bryce jammed his foot in the door. "I told you we're police officers," he growled and shoved the door open. He stepped into the room. Inside the room, lounged on the bed in skimpy pajamas, lay Mrs. Merle Bolen, the owner of the hotel, and J. Ray O'Donnell. O'Donnell was one of the gangsters the detectives had come to question. He was holding two automatic pistols. Bryce's .38 was still holstered on his hip under his coat. Without saying a word O'Donnell raised the pistols at Bryce to fire point blank. A single motion blurred with speed, Bryce drew and killed him before he could pull the trigger. Bryce's first shot entered O'Donnell's chin followed by four that struck him in the head area, the fifth going into the mattress of the bed. Screaming, the woman leaped to safety near a wash stand in the corner. Bryce later said, "When I looked into the room there he was, up on his elbows with a gun in both hands, aimed right at me. He was lying on the near side, and the woman was on the other side of him. I jumped to one side, out of the line of fire, grabbed my gun and tore him up." Both women were arrested along with one of the three men the officers were looking for, Tom Walton. Clyde Barrow's buddy, Harvey Pugh, was arrested shortly thereafter when he returned to pick up his automobile. The incident was told and retold time after time by law officers over the years and is probably as perfect an example of the "fast draw" in action as ever recorded. So just how fast was Jelly Bryce, anyway? As stated earlier, in 1945 Life Magazine clocked his draw and fire at two-fifths of a second. O'Donnell probably never knew what hit him. Ironically, on that day, Bryce was carrying a .44 calibre revolver that he called his "lucky gun" because its ivory handle carried an embossed black cat, a number 13 and a steer head on the opposite side. A newspaper photo at the time shows Bryce dapperly dressed in white slacks, hat and vest. In fact it was in Oklahoma City that his rather dandified way of dressing earned him the nick-name Jelly. Bryce was always a fancy dresser. One oppressively hot Oklahoma City summer night he and his partner shot it out with a couple of crooks and one of them, wounded, crawled into a movie theater. In that era, before television, movie theaters were sumptuously decorated, vast air-conditioned palaces, complete with chandeliers, almost always packed with crowds in summer, people seeking relief from the heat. Bryce had management turn the house lights up. The mortally wounded gangster had crawled up a carpeted stairway where he had partially lost consciousness. Bryce went over and peered down at the poor soul. The dying crook looked up at him and said, "I can't believe I was killed by a jelly bean like you." Jelly bean was a term for a fancy dresser who might even be a touch sissified. The remark hit the papers and Bryce quickly became known as "Jelly", a name he grew to like. It was also in Oklahoma City that Bryce perfected his quick draw, practicing facing a full-length mirror at police headquarters, sometimes for as much as 8 hours at a time. It was out of this practice that he developed the stance later adapted by most law enforcement agencies around the country. In the stance the weight is shifted slightly forward so that if the officer is hit he will fall forward and be able to keep firing. In November, 1934 Bryce left Oklahoma City for the FBI. He was always a reticent man with details about his exploits. Although it is common knowledge that he killed several people while with the FBI specifics are not known. Bryce only confided in other agents. However, his name was quietly linked with the slayings of the Barker gang and others. In 1941 his career entered a new level when he was appointed Special Agent in Charge (SAC) in El Paso. He also served as SAC in San Antonio, Albuquerque and Oklahoma City. Sometime during this period Bryce developed what came to be known as the FBI fast-draw holster. For the first part of his career Bryce carried either the "lucky" .44 or the standard police issued .38 Special until Smith and Wesson gave him one of the first .357 Magnums. During the 40's and 50's Bryce again received national attention, this time for the firearms demonstrations he conducted for various groups. He was able to do tricks with firearms that few could duplicate. One of his more unusual was performed with a .22 rifle. He would have someone throw a Mexican peso in the air and he would hit it with the gun, but first he would announce that he would put the bullet "close to the edge" so that it would make a good watch fob. And he would. In fact, witnesses say that Bryce never missed a coin thrown in the air. Sometimes he would shoot one with a 30.06 for fun. Of course, the coin would just disappear. He always laughed about how they would shoot coins in cowboy movies with Winchester rifles. He would also drop a pill box off the back of his hand and shoot it before it got to his waist. He did a whole series of tricks involving clay pigeons. He would shoot them with his .357. Then he would shoot them holding the pistol upside down. He would take a pump shotgun, have somebody hold three clay pigeons, and put two more on the stock of his gun. Then they would throw all five up and he would bust them all firing from the hip, pumping between shots, and getting the last one about a foot off the ground. He was fond of writing his name in the sky with a sub machine gun full of tracer bullets: DA Bryce. Then he would go back and dot the D. and the A. Bryce's trademark was a big diamond ring he wore. He would have somebody put a clay pigeon on a fencepost then he would aim his pistol backwards over his shoulder, using the ring like a mirror, and bust it. And if he left a little piece sitting on the fence post he'd say, "Wait a second," and get it, too. He had a joke he would play sometimes on the audience. He would borrow an expensive watch from someone then secretly switch it for a cheap one he had with him. Then he would "accidentally" shoot the expensive watch and the crowd would gasp. Bryce would then gleefully give the expensive watch back to the person he had borrowed it from. In fact, for all the drama of his career, Bryce was an easy-going, relaxed, friendly guy. He was well liked by everyone who worked with him and extremely intelligent with a retentive memory. Other agents said he never forgot anything. He often joked that his ability as a gunman was topped only by his skill as a fisherman. So, just how good were Bryce's eyes? An optometrist asked about it said, "It's impossible to measure beyond 20/10. It would be more than just the eyes, though; it would be the eye-hand coordination which would have to be almost unbelievable." It has been known as historical fact that some human beings are gifted with eyesight that seems almost supernatural to the average man. Ted Williams, it was said, could read the label off a phonograph record spun through the air. General Chuck Yeager could see fighter planes coming 50 miles away. Bryce one day confessed to FBI agent Bob Oswalt that he could see the bullet leave the gun and his eyes could follow its trajectory to the target. That, he said, was why he could do the things he did. Before dismissing it out of hand, it must be remembered that Bryce could hit a Mexican peso thrown through the air with a .22 and he never, ever missed. Not only that but ten years after his retirement his niece says that he had long since quit shooting for fun but that, when called upon, he would demonstrate exactly the same level of skill as the day he retired. Like an aging Samurai in cowboy hat, he had transcended the need for practice of any kind. Ultimately, though, Bryce's near mythical reputation among law-enforcement officers in the southwest is based, not upon trick shooting, but the number of people he killed in face-to-face confrontations. During his tenure as SAC in Oklahoma City, for instance, Bryce routinely delegated desk responsibilities to other agents. He spent his time hunting and fishing on his ranch in Kiowa County, Oklahoma, giving weapons training for law enforcement agencies, and firearms demonstrations to everyone from Army generals to cub scout groups. Only when a dangerous arrest was to be made did he really go to work. He always personally made every dangerous arrest in his jurisdiction. He never knowingly asked anyone to make an arrest he thought to be risky. He was a highly trained specialist: the man who went to the door. It was during this period that Bryce was probably involved in the bulk of shootings that produced his awesome reputation. THE BRYCE-EFFECT Typically, one of America's most wanted might be spotted and trailed back to a cheap motel somewhere. He would be held under surveillance then and Bryce would be notified. Bryce would arrive and go to the man's door. If he resisted arrest, he would probably be killed. If there was a stand-off hostage situation with a dangerous killer who was holed up under cover somewhere, Bryce would be summoned. He would be the "special negotiator" who would go inside to "negotiate" the man's surrender. If Bryce determined the man would not surrender, he would be killed. In fact, some old lawmen came to irrationally believe in what they called the "Bryce-effect". It was relegated to the same class of phenomenon as rats leaving a ship before the ice berg is struck. It was based on the observation that in stand-off situations the mere arrival of Bryce on the scene would often suddenly and inexplicably precipitate the surrender of hardened criminals that no one thought would give up. The criminal would have no way of knowing who Bryce was or that he had even arrived. Yet, it was as if Bryce carried death in his aura, radiated such profound danger, that at some level of mind the criminal knew that death had arrived. Does anyone actually know how many men he killed? "I can tell you what he told me," ex-Oklahoma City chief of police Bob Wilder says. "Nineteen." Then he amends, "Well, he told me he was involved in 19 shootings." The implication being that Bryce never wounded anybody. "Aren't you interested in bringing them back alive?" someone once quipped. "I'm more interested in bringing me back alive," he said. He retired in 1958. In that era Oklahoma was a "dry" state. Unfortunately, alcohol was available everywhere. This led to widespread corruption on police departments and in government statewide. Bryce, the Fed, was disgusted by this and ran for governor on an independent "throw the bums out and clean house" ticket. He placed third but finished better than any other third party candidate in the history of Oklahoma. After that he did some private detective work but mainly just hunted and fished. Back when he was in charge of the El Paso office, business had taken him one day to Roswell, New Mexico where he saw the most beautiful girl he had ever seen crossing a street. Bryce went up to her, introduced himself and said, "I just thought you'd want to know. I'm going to marry you." And he did. Her name was Shirley Bloodworth and they were married July 27, 1944 in Carrizozo, New Mexico. Later, in 1945, they had one son, Johnny. After Bryce retired he and Shirley spent all of their time on their ranch in Mountain View. They were inseparable. Then, one afternoon in the early seventies, Shirley was alone in the car on her way home. There was a peculiar stretch of road on the highway, an S curve that went under an overpass then up over a creek. That afternoon the sun blinded her and she ran directly into an oncoming car. Her injuries were terrible in nature and she never fully recovered. About a year later, she had an aneurism and died on Sunday, April 15, 1973 in St. Anthony's hospital in Oklahoma City. Bryce was devastated. "It just killed old Bryce," one old friend remembered. The last year of his life he seemed dazed. The years had taken their toll, anyway. Bryce had no fear for himself but had always been haunted by the notion that someone would seek revenge against his child. One friend in Mountain View remembered a day after school when the little boy had gone off to play with a friend and Bryce and his whole family had gone into overdrive searching for him, fearing foul play. Now the pressures of his life were catching up with him. He smoked too much. More than anything, he grieved for his beloved Shirley. He seemed lost. Wherever he went, though, he was armed. His niece recalled that, taking a lesson from Bill Hickock, he never sat with his back to a room. He was always aware of the dark possibilities. His niece recalled that he bought one of the very first microwave ovens in the early seventies and managed to blow an egg up trying to cook it. He said upon hearing the pop that he thought someone had gotten into his house with a gun and shot him. In May of 1974 there was a get-together of retired FBI agents held at the Shangri-la Lodge near Grand Lake. Bryce went, taking with him Shirley's little dog, a poodle, that he seemed particularly devoted to since her death. He seemed tired and faded that weekend. "I'm so tired," he told another old agent. "I've never been so tired in my life." On Saturday night, after dinner, he went up to bed early. Sunday around noon, when everyone was checking out, he still hadn't come down. Two of his friends went up and knocked but assumed he was just sleeping soundly, then departed. On Monday morning the howls of his little dog finally brought the staff. He had died in his sleep of a heart attack. It is a death that some in modern society call the angel's death, a death free from pain and suffering. Jelly Bryce, that indestructible lawman, had been done in by something as simple as a broken heart. His funeral was the following Thursday in Mountain View in the same church where Shirley's had been, a mere thirteen months earlier. Afterwards they buried him beside her in the Mountain View cemetery. Bryce had died with a clear conscience. He had never killed anyone he didn't have to kill. He had done his duty well indeed. http://www.liveleak.com/view?i=169_1324256639 BOMBBOMBIRAN Better format of The Jelly Bryce Story jelly, bryce, FBI Sun, 18 Dec 2011 14:55:37 -0500 http://www.liveleak.com/view?i=35a_1324237878 BOMBBOMBIRAN On November 12, 1945, Life Magazine ran an unusual story. It was a photographic study of an FBI agent named Jelly Bryce drawing and firing his .357 Magnum in two-fifths of a second, faster than the human eye can follow. In the pictures Bryce dropped a silver dollar from shoulder height with his right hand then drew with the same hand and shot the coin before it reached his waist. What the article did not say was that Bryce could not only draw fast in front of a camera, but also in front of people who were trying to kill him. In fact, at that time, Bryce had already killed over 10 men in face-to-face shootouts as a city policeman and FBI Agent. In his era Bryce was undoubtedly the FBI's deadliest gun and may have been the best they ever had. To paraphrase Butch Cassidy and the Sundance Kid: who was this guy? D.A. Bryce was born in 1906 in Mt. View, Oklahoma, a small town in southwest Oklahoma. There was a story that went around in later years that baby Bryce had been allowed to teethe on his daddy's pistol and had thereby imbibed some of his later ability with hand guns, a tall tale,obviously. Not so, says Bryce's sister, Lila Dawson. "When he was a baby they let him teethe on Daddy's unloaded pistol. They propped him up with pillows there in the crib and let him go after it." By the time of his retirement in 1958 Bryce had become so legendary among lawmen of the Southwest that a lot of apocryphal stories about him floated around, a surprising number of which turn out to be true. Two things about Bryce's childhood are certain: he was recognized early on as a prodigy with firearms and he was encouraged by those around him. In particular he was encouraged by a doting grandfather who furnished him with shotgun shells and Bryce himself once managed to save over a hundred dollars shining shoes which he then invested in ammunition. And in those days a hundred dollars would buy a barn-load of ammunition. In short, he practiced a lot, but there was more going on there than just practice. Bryce was born with an astonishing natural talent. When Leah Rhymer met Bryce he was ten years old and owned a little .22 rifle he used for hunting rabbits and shooting tin cans. "And," she says, "he never missed." Never? "No. Never. He was a perfect shot." Bryce was the only kid that age she ever knew who had his own rifle and was allowed to use it unsupervised. He also had an air rifle he got a lot of mileage out of in town. He was seldom without one or the other. "He really just grew up down on the creek bank with a rifle in his hand," his niece, D.A. Dawson says. In those days the army would hold something called a citizen's military camp and, after graduating from high school, Bryce attended one at Ft. Sill, Oklahoma along with several hundred other young men. While there he won first in pistol, first in rifle, and then went on to win the national rifle competition at Camp Perry in Ohio. SHOOTING MATCH Out of high school, it was time to think about the future and gainful employment. More than anything in the world Bryce loved hunting and fishing so later that summer he became a state game ranger in Oklahoma. Apparently he grew restless with that, though, because after only six months he resigned and embarked for the University of Oklahoma where he planned to enroll. While en route he caught wind of a pistol contest where they were offering a hundred dollars in gold as first prize. That got his attention fast. The contest was in Shawnee, Oklahoma and was being held as part of the annual Oklahoma Sheriff's and Peace Officers convention. Bryce drove down, found the firing range, got out of his car and approached Clarence Hurt, then the Night Chief of Police and a member of the Oklahoma City pistol team. "This contest open to anybody?" Bryce asked. "You think you can shoot, huh?" Hurt said, eyeing him skeptically. "I think I can, yes," Bryce said. Hurt thought the whole thing kind of flaky, this Joe College in white slacks and a sweater approaching him out of the blue and besides that he was shooting an old smooth-bore .38 that was practically an antique. But the Oklahoma City pistol team didn't have much chance of winning that day and Hurt, their best shot, badly wanted his team to win. And who knew? Maybe this kid would be a decent shot. Hurt led him behind a nearby hill to see what he could do. "What do you want me to shoot?" Hurt took out an old envelope and stuck it in the cleft of a tree trunk and walked off the regulation distance. "Shoot that." "Can I draw and shoot? I'm better if I draw first than just stand still." "Up to you." Bryce drew and put six fast shots into an area the size of a silver dollar. Clarence Hurt, for once in his life almost speechless, could only say, "You are now a member of the Oklahoma City Police Department." Bryce won the hundred dollars in gold that day and the pistol team won, too, largely because of his shooting. More importantly he won a new career. OKLAHOMA CITY POLICEMAN The strangest part of the story, though, was what happened his first couple of days on the job. Bryce told it often in later years and Bob Oswalt, retired FBI, heard it more than once. After reporting for work in Oklahoma City, Bryce, in plain clothes, was leaving a restaurant in downtown Oklahoma City at high noon. Once out on the sidewalk he saw a man sitting in a nearby car that looked suspiciously like a face he had seen on wanted posters in the Oklahoma City area. What's more the man was behaving in a suspicious manner, peering around, acting nervous. Bryce walked over to the car, around to the driver's door, and opened it. The man inside looked up, startled. He had some tools and it looked like he was in the process of trying to start the car without a key. "What are you doing?" Bryce asked. "Who are you?" the man snarled. "A police officer." Without another word the man drew a pistol from under his coat and tried to aim it at Bryce. Before he could fire Bryce drew and killed him. The man slid out of the car onto the cement, dead. The whole thing amazed Bryce. He hadn't expected the guy to draw on him at all. But worse was yet to come. The police were phoned by onlookers and when they arrived Bryce was so new on the force that the captain didn't know him. Worse yet, Bryce hadn't been issued a badge yet. He was summarily arrested for murder and taken to jail. Fortunately Clarence Hurt, who had hired him, showed up that night and turned him loose. "The man is a police officer!" Hurt roared. Bryce was free, but not before his father heard reports of his arrest on the radio news. His father arrived in Oklahoma City that night with a lawyer. Bryce's father was naturally relieved that no charges were going to be filed but still wanted his son to come home to the safety of small town life. Bryce told him, "I've never disobeyed you before but this is what I want to do. I want to be a policeman." To understand Bryces career in Oklahoma City it is necessary to understand the world of the peace officer in the late 20's and early 30's. It was anything but peaceful. In 1924, just three years before Bryce began, Bill Tilghman, last of the great lawmen of the old west, was killed in Cromwell, Oklahoma, while trying to disarm a drunk. When Bryce's career began, the wild west was not a dim memory but a living presence. How wild was it? On New Year's Day, 1934, the Oklahoma City Times joked that the economy was so bad even bank robbery was in a slump. There were only 30 banks robbed in Oklahoma in 1933 as opposed to 59 in 1932. Fifty-nine bank robberies? That's more than one a week. In 1926, Bryce's senior year in highschool, there were 211 homicides in the state. The media was glamorizing bank robbers and criminals and, in a sense, it was open season on police officers; there were nine killed in Oklahoma City just in the decade of the thirties. It was the first hint of the depression, dust bowl and economic upheaval waiting in the wings. One night in 1927 Bryce, alone on night patrol, saw two men in an alley trying to jimmy the back door of a furniture store. He swerved his patrol car into the mouth of the alley, skidding to a stop with his two front lights trained on the two men. He jumped from the car. The two men spun and both opened fire at the same instant. Bryce killed them both instantly with just two shots. What happened next was later told by Clarence Hurt, then still Night Chief of Police in Oklahoma City. He was in his office when Bryce came and asked him to follow him downstairs. Hurt followed Bryce down to his car where he opened the back door and revealed two extremely dead burglars. "What you want me to do with them?" Bryce asked. Hurt, a small, barrel-chested man given to chewing a crooked little pipe, explained, "Take 'em to the morgue, son." Then, in later years when Hurt told the story he would inevitably add, "And you know what that Indian did then? Went home and slept like a baby!" Bryce had killed 3 men his first year, all of them attempting to fire first. On Memorial day, 1933 eleven convicts escaped from the Kansas State Penitentiary in Lansing. One of them, Wilbur Underhill, proceeded to go on a bank robbing spree in a three state area. He was wanted for at least three cold-blooded murders, earning himself the nickname "tri-state terror" in the papers. Underhill was so mean he once killed a drug store employee during a holdup for not raising his hands fast enough. RAID ON UNDERHILL In late December of that year Underhill was spotted by police in south Oklahoma City and tailed back to Shawnee, Oklahoma, a town about forty miles east. A posse of federal and county detectives gathered quickly at the Shawnee police department and hurriedly mapped an attack strategy. The posse included Bryce and his old pal, Clarence Hurt. By then it was dark. A scout car was dispatched to go and drive around the house where Underhill and companions were holed up. It was raining and the night was inky black but the officers reported a light was burning in the house and a drinking party was apparently underway. At three a.m. the police closed in, surrounding the house. The posse, under the direction of R.H. Colvin of the U.S. Investigation Bureau, consisted of six federal agents and eight deputies. About three in the morning Hurt, Bryce and others took up positions at the rear of the house with the remaining officers positioned in the front and along the sides. A light came on in the rear bedroom. The officers approached. Hurt pressed his face against the screen and saw that it was Underhill and his wife. Hurt yelled, "This is the law, Wilbur, stick'em up "Yeah, ok." Underhill said, raising his hands about halfway into the air. Then he suddenly whirled and grabbed two Lugers sitting on the nightstand beside the bed. Underhill and the police opened up at the same instant. Underhill was hit by a fusillade of bullets, knocked down, yet somehow managed to get up and charge out the front of the house through a pelting of gunfire, disappearing into the night. His wife fainted. None of the officers were hurt but they knew Underhill had been seriously wounded, probably mortally. In fact, no one could believe he had managed to run away with so many bullets in him. Bloodhounds were summoned. They followed him. They found three places where he had fallen, full face down, in the mud. A tip soon came in that Underhill was hiding in the back of a furniture store several blocks away, downtown. Hurt, Bryce and the others found him there, in bed, covers pulled up under his chin. He had been gut-shot with a gas gun several times. All the fight had leaked out of him. He surrendered meekly. Too mean to die, he clung to life for several weeks, finally succumbing in the state prison in McAlester, Oklahoma. By 1934 the United States was truly in a crisis of lawlessness. After the Kansas City Massacre the FBI had been given the authority to carry firearms, the problem being they had few people well-trained enough with weapons to battle the more vicious criminals then operating. As one old lawman says, "You know, there's a lot of plain old sorriness around nowadays but, back then, there were some genuinely mean SOB's." Baby Face Nelson had managed to kill two FBI agents in one night in November of 1934, receiving mortal wounds himself in the process. J. Edgar Hoover's FBI went in search of lawmen skilled as "gunslingers." Within 6 months they hired 3 detectives from the Oklahoma City pistol team - Jerry Campbell, Clarence Hurt, the Night Chief, and Oklahoma City's youngest detective, Jelly Bryce. Although Bryce had no college diploma, it was rumored that J. Edgar Hoover's mind was made up by the events surrounding July 18, 1934. OUTLAW HARVEY PUGH In fact, no story about Bryce has been told and retold more times or gained more mythical status among old-time peace officers. Oklahoma City detectives learned that there were three known gangsters holed up at the Wren Hotel at 408 1/2 West Main in Oklahoma City. One was known to be Harvey Pugh, former companion of murderer and cop killer Clyde Barrow. Pugh himself was wanted for the murder of a police officer in McPherson, Kansas. Bryce and two other detectives were dispatched to arrest Pugh and question the other two men. They arrived at the hotel at around 8 a.m. At the front desk was an elderly woman, Nora Bingaman, whose daughter owned the hotel. The officers asked to see the owner, Mrs Merle Bolen, 28 years old. Mrs. Bingaman agreed to take them to her daughter's room. They followed the old lady up the dark stairs and down a dingy hallway to her daughter's room. The old lady knocked perfunctorily and opened the door. But before the detectives could enter the old lady looked startled and tried to step back and pull the door closed again. Bryce jammed his foot in the door. "I told you we're police officers," he growled and shoved the door open. He stepped into the room. Inside the room, lounged on the bed in skimpy pajamas, lay Mrs. Merle Bolen, the owner of the hotel, and J. Ray O'Donnell. O'Donnell was one of the gangsters the detectives had come to question. He was holding two automatic pistols. Bryce's .38 was still holstered on his hip under his coat. Without saying a word O'Donnell raised the pistols at Bryce to fire point blank. A single motion blurred with speed, Bryce drew and killed him before he could pull the trigger. Bryce's first shot entered O'Donnell's chin followed by four that struck him in the head area, the fifth going into the mattress of the bed. Screaming, the woman leaped to safety near a wash stand in the corner. Bryce later said, "When I looked into the room there he was, up on his elbows with a gun in both hands, aimed right at me. He was lying on the near side, and the woman was on the other side of him. I jumped to one side, out of the line of fire, grabbed my gun and tore him up." Both women were arrested along with one of the three men the officers were looking for, Tom Walton. Clyde Barrow's buddy, Harvey Pugh, was arrested shortly thereafter when he returned to pick up his automobile. The incident was told and retold time after time by law officers over the years and is probably as perfect an example of the "fast draw" in action as ever recorded. So just how fast was Jelly Bryce, anyway? As stated earlier, in 1945 Life Magazine clocked his draw and fire at two-fifths of a second. O'Donnell probably never knew what hit him. Ironically, on that day, Bryce was carrying a .44 calibre revolver that he called his "lucky gun" because its ivory handle carried an embossed black cat, a number 13 and a steer head on the opposite side. A newspaper photo at the time shows Bryce dapperly dressed in white slacks, hat and vest. In fact it was in Oklahoma City that his rather dandified way of dressing earned him the nick-name Jelly. Bryce was always a fancy dresser. One oppressively hot Oklahoma City summer night he and his partner shot it out with a couple of crooks and one of them, wounded, crawled into a movie theater. In that era, before television, movie theaters were sumptuously decorated, vast air-conditioned palaces, complete with chandeliers, almost always packed with crowds in summer, people seeking relief from the heat. Bryce had management turn the house lights up. The mortally wounded gangster had crawled up a carpeted stairway where he had partially lost consciousness. Bryce went over and peered down at the poor soul. The dying crook looked up at him and said, "I can't believe I was killed by a jelly bean like you." Jelly bean was a term for a fancy dresser who might even be a touch sissified. The remark hit the papers and Bryce quickly became known as "Jelly", a name he grew to like. It was also in Oklahoma City that Bryce perfected his quick draw, practicing facing a full-length mirror at police headquarters, sometimes for as much as 8 hours at a time. It was out of this practice that he developed the stance later adapted by most law enforcement agencies around the country. In the stance the weight is shifted slightly forward so that if the officer is hit he will fall forward and be able to keep firing. In November, 1934 Bryce left Oklahoma City for the FBI. He was always a reticent man with details about his exploits. Although it is common knowledge that he killed several people while with the FBI specifics are not known. Bryce only confided in other agents. However, his name was quietly linked with the slayings of the Barker gang and others. In 1941 his career entered a new level when he was appointed Special Agent in Charge (SAC) in El Paso. He also served as SAC in San Antonio, Albuquerque and Oklahoma City. Sometime during this period Bryce developed what came to be known as the FBI fast-draw holster. For the first part of his career Bryce carried either the "lucky" .44 or the standard police issued .38 Special until Smith and Wesson gave him one of the first .357 Magnums. During the 40's and 50's Bryce again received national attention, this time for the firearms demonstrations he conducted for various groups. He was able to do tricks with firearms that few could duplicate. One of his more unusual was performed with a .22 rifle. He would have someone throw a Mexican peso in the air and he would hit it with the gun, but first he would announce that he would put the bullet "close to the edge" so that it would make a good watch fob. And he would. In fact, witnesses say that Bryce never missed a coin thrown in the air. Sometimes he would shoot one with a 30.06 for fun. Of course, the coin would just disappear. He always laughed about how they would shoot coins in cowboy movies with Winchester rifles. He would also drop a pill box off the back of his hand and shoot it before it got to his waist. He did a whole series of tricks involving clay pigeons. He would shoot them with his .357. Then he would shoot them holding the pistol upside down. He would take a pump shotgun, have somebody hold three clay pigeons, and put two more on the stock of his gun. Then they would throw all five up and he would bust them all firing from the hip, pumping between shots, and getting the last one about a foot off the ground. He was fond of writing his name in the sky with a sub machine gun full of tracer bullets: DA Bryce. Then he would go back and dot the D. and the A. Bryce's trademark was a big diamond ring he wore. He would have somebody put a clay pigeon on a fencepost then he would aim his pistol backwards over his shoulder, using the ring like a mirror, and bust it. And if he left a little piece sitting on the fence post he'd say, "Wait a second," and get it, too. He had a joke he would play sometimes on the audience. He would borrow an expensive watch from someone then secretly switch it for a cheap one he had with him. Then he would "accidentally" shoot the expensive watch and the crowd would gasp. Bryce would then gleefully give the expensive watch back to the person he had borrowed it from. In fact, for all the drama of his career, Bryce was an easy-going, relaxed, friendly guy. He was well liked by everyone who worked with him and extremely intelligent with a retentive memory. Other agents said he never forgot anything. He often joked that his ability as a gunman was topped only by his skill as a fisherman. So, just how good were Bryce's eyes? An optometrist asked about it said, "It's impossible to measure beyond 20/10. It would be more than just the eyes, though; it would be the eye-hand coordination which would have to be almost unbelievable." It has been known as historical fact that some human beings are gifted with eyesight that seems almost supernatural to the average man. Ted Williams, it was said, could read the label off a phonograph record spun through the air. General Chuck Yeager could see fighter planes coming 50 miles away. Bryce one day confessed to FBI agent Bob Oswalt that he could see the bullet leave the gun and his eyes could follow its trajectory to the target. That, he said, was why he could do the things he did. Before dismissing it out of hand, it must be remembered that Bryce could hit a Mexican peso thrown through the air with a .22 and he never, ever missed. Not only that but ten years after his retirement his niece says that he had long since quit shooting for fun but that, when called upon, he would demonstrate exactly the same level of skill as the day he retired. Like an aging Samurai in cowboy hat, he had transcended the need for practice of any kind. Ultimately, though, Bryce's near mythical reputation among law-enforcement officers in the southwest is based, not upon trick shooting, but the number of people he killed in face-to-face confrontations. During his tenure as SAC in Oklahoma City, for instance, Bryce routinely delegated desk responsibilities to other agents. He spent his time hunting and fishing on his ranch in Kiowa County, Oklahoma, giving weapons training for law enforcement agencies, and firearms demonstrations to everyone from Army generals to cub scout groups. Only when a dangerous arrest was to be made did he really go to work. He always personally made every dangerous arrest in his jurisdiction. He never knowingly asked anyone to make an arrest he thought to be risky. He was a highly trained specialist: the man who went to the door. It was during this period that Bryce was probably involved in the bulk of shootings that produced his awesome reputation. THE BRYCE-EFFECT Typically, one of America's most wanted might be spotted and trailed back to a cheap motel somewhere. He would be held under surveillance then and Bryce would be notified. Bryce would arrive and go to the man's door. If he resisted arrest, he would probably be killed. If there was a stand-off hostage situation with a dangerous killer who was holed up under cover somewhere, Bryce would be summoned. He would be the "special negotiator" who would go inside to "negotiate" the man's surrender. If Bryce determined the man would not surrender, he would be killed. In fact, some old lawmen came to irrationally believe in what they called the "Bryce-effect". It was relegated to the same class of phenomenon as rats leaving a ship before the ice berg is struck. It was based on the observation that in stand-off situations the mere arrival of Bryce on the scene would often suddenly and inexplicably precipitate the surrender of hardened criminals that no one thought would give up. The criminal would have no way of knowing who Bryce was or that he had even arrived. Yet, it was as if Bryce carried death in his aura, radiated such profound danger, that at some level of mind the criminal knew that death had arrived. Does anyone actually know how many men he killed? "I can tell you what he told me," ex-Oklahoma City chief of police Bob Wilder says. "Nineteen." Then he amends, "Well, he told me he was involved in 19 shootings." The implication being that Bryce never wounded anybody. "Aren't you interested in bringing them back alive?" someone once quipped. "I'm more interested in bringing me back alive," he said. He retired in 1958. In that era Oklahoma was a "dry" state. Unfortunately, alcohol was available everywhere. This led to widespread corruption on police departments and in government statewide. Bryce, the Fed, was disgusted by this and ran for governor on an independent "throw the bums out and clean house" ticket. He placed third but finished better than any other third party candidate in the history of Oklahoma. After that he did some private detective work but mainly just hunted and fished. Back when he was in charge of the El Paso office, business had taken him one day to Roswell, New Mexico where he saw the most beautiful girl he had ever seen crossing a street. Bryce went up to her, introduced himself and said, "I just thought you'd want to know. I'm going to marry you." And he did. Her name was Shirley Bloodworth and they were married July 27, 1944 in Carrizozo, New Mexico. Later, in 1945, they had one son, Johnny. After Bryce retired he and Shirley spent all of their time on their ranch in Mountain View. They were inseparable. Then, one afternoon in the early seventies, Shirley was alone in the car on her way home. There was a peculiar stretch of road on the highway, an S curve that went under an overpass then up over a creek. That afternoon the sun blinded her and she ran directly into an oncoming car. Her injuries were terrible in nature and she never fully recovered. About a year later, she had an aneurism and died on Sunday, April 15, 1973 in St. Anthony's hospital in Oklahoma City. Bryce was devastated. "It just killed old Bryce," one old friend remembered. The last year of his life he seemed dazed. The years had taken their toll, anyway. Bryce had no fear for himself but had always been haunted by the notion that someone would seek revenge against his child. One friend in Mountain View remembered a day after school when the little boy had gone off to play with a friend and Bryce and his whole family had gone into overdrive searching for him, fearing foul play. Now the pressures of his life were catching up with him. He smoked too much. More than anything, he grieved for his beloved Shirley. He seemed lost. Wherever he went, though, he was armed. His niece recalled that, taking a lesson from Bill Hickock, he never sat with his back to a room. He was always aware of the dark possibilities. His niece recalled that he bought one of the very first microwave ovens in the early seventies and managed to blow an egg up trying to cook it. He said upon hearing the pop that he thought someone had gotten into his house with a gun and shot him. In May of 1974 there was a get-together of retired FBI agents held at the Shangri-la Lodge near Grand Lake. Bryce went, taking with him Shirley's little dog, a poodle, that he seemed particularly devoted to since her death. He seemed tired and faded that weekend. "I'm so tired," he told another old agent. "I've never been so tired in my life." On Saturday night, after dinner, he went up to bed early. Sunday around noon, when everyone was checking out, he still hadn't come down. Two of his friends went up and knocked but assumed he was just sleeping soundly, then departed. On Monday morning the howls of his little dog finally brought the staff. He had died in his sleep of a heart attack. It is a death that some in modern society call the angel's death, a death free from pain and suffering. Jelly Bryce, that indestructible lawman, had been done in by something as simple as a broken heart. His funeral was the following Thursday in Mountain View in the same church where Shirley's had been, a mere thirteen months earlier. Afterwards they buried him beside her in the Mountain View cemetery. Bryce had died with a clear conscience. He had never killed anyone he didn't have to kill. He had done his duty well indeed. http://www.liveleak.com/view?i=35a_1324237878 BOMBBOMBIRAN Good Story on the best of the FBI, Jelly Bryce jelly, bryce, FBI Sun, 07 Aug 2011 07:24:32 -0400 http://www.liveleak.com/view?i=020_1312715736 24038462 Whitehall's iPads, limo tours and free lunches at private clubs all paid for on plastic by YOU A catalogue of excess spending on Government credit cards has emerged in recent weeks. Everything from a limousine tour of California to Apple iPads and luxury hotel rooms has been paid for on the procurement cards. And when civil servants are not flashing the plastic, their town hall colleagues milk the taxpayer-funded perk to pay for high-end international trips. Taxpayer funded luxury: Penpushers charged taxpayers for a trip round California in a limousineLast year alone, Government departments ran up lb25 million in credit card bills on first-class flights, five-star hotels, exclusive restaurants and shopping sprees. Despite orders to tighten their belts and cut budgets, civil servants spent more than lb370,000 on food. Golf, theatre trips and other leisure activities soaked up another lb117,000. Almost lb3 million went on travel, half of it on plush hotels in exotic locations in countries including Mexico, Indonesia and Dubai. There are more than 140,000 procurement cards in use across Government departments and quangos. But some of the exposed spending has sparked condemnation from Coalition Ministers and value-for-money campaigners alike. The disclosure of bills from recent years revealed that civil servants lavished more than lb60,000 on dining at top-rated restaurants. They included the Cinnamon Club in Westminster and Quo Vadis, a private dining club in Soho. Another lb5,000 was spent on fast food. Nearly lb500,000 went on shopping sprees on websites such as Amazon and stores including Harrods. Trendy: The Brickhouse bar on Brick Lane in Shoreditch, east LondonMandarins also used the cards to settle bills at luxury resorts, such as the Shangri La in Sydney, Australia. In addition, more than lb2 million went on away days and residential training at exclusive British retreats. It has emerged that on a trip to California in 2008, the Department for Culture, Media and Sport spent lb4,400 on limousines from a firm promising the 'most luxurious fleet'. Margaret Hodge, then Labour Culture Minister, also blew thousands to stay with two civil servants in the five-star Fairmont Miramar Hotel in Santa Monica on a PR trip. It caters for 'discriminating guests seeking luxury and pampering'. The Department for International Development, which oversees Britain's aid to poor countries, used the plastic to pay for lb190,000 of flights last year and stay at grand resorts in places like Dubai. Two months ago, the Cabinet Office was accused of refusing to release details of individual spending by civil servants. However, critic Eric Pickles, the Communities Secretary, has claimed the card system led to a 'breakdown of financial controls'. And the TaxPayers' Alliance called the bills 'astonishing', adding: 'It's unacceptable that some departments could not provide details. Taxpayers have a right to know where their money has gone.' Away from Whitehall, councillors and officials have run up a bill topping lb4 million on trips since 2008, settled by procurement cards. http://www.liveleak.com/view?i=020_1312715736 24038462 UK: The Expences Scandal Starts Again Part 2 expences, scandal, Sun, 05 Dec 2010 14:53:02 -0500 http://www.liveleak.com/view?i=2c8_1291576873 smyle Awesome Non Youtube Tuneage: If This Is Goodbye - from the album "All the Roadrunning", - Mark Knopfler and Emmylou Harris, 2006. ---- Brothers in Arms - from the album "Brothers in Arms" - Dire Straits (1985). --------- The Band: Guy Fletcher (Dire Straits, Keyboards), Danny Cummings (drums), Dudley Phillips (electric and double bass), Luke Brighty (guitar) and John McCusker (fiddle). Biography: Mark Knopfler is a guitarist, singer, songwriter, and bandleader. His group, Dire Straits, was formed in London in 1977 and went on to become an international success after the release of its debut album in 1978. Though it began as a group with a permanent lineup led by Knopfler, in its first few years it evolved into a brand name for Knopfler with varying personnel. Starting with Local Hero in 1983, Knopfler has scored several motion pictures. He has also recorded with Chet Atkins and with the Notting Hillbillies. In 1995, Knopfler quietly laid Dire Straits to rest. He launched a full-fledged solo career with the release of Golden Heart in 1996; subsequent soundtrack efforts include 1998's Wag the Dog, 1998's Metroland, and 2002's Shot at Glory. Sailing to Philadelphia, a lush collection of folk-rock and breezy Americana that featured guest appearances by James Taylor, Van Morrison, and Squeeze leaders Glenn Tilbrook and Chris Difford, appeared in fall 2000, and Ragpicker's Dream followed in 2002. In 2003, on the way to rehearsals in London, Knopfler broke his collarbone, shoulder, and seven ribs in a motorcycle crash. He returned in 2004 with Shangri-La, and in 2006 he completed All the Road Running, a collaboration with Emmylou Harris recorded over the span of nearly seven years that also found life as a live CD/DVD release (Real Live Roadrunning) later that November. Kill to Get Crimson appeared in 2007, and Get Lucky in 2009. http://www.allmusic.com/artist/mark-knopfler-p94636/biography http://www.liveleak.com/view?i=2c8_1291576873 smyle MARK KNOPFLER - Acoustic Live (Hurlingham Club, 9 Sept. 2009 - Prince's Trust, London) MARK KNOPFLER, If This Is Goodbye, Brothers in Arms, NOT YOUTUBE, music, Dire Straits, Prince's Trust, rock n roll, awesomeness