Careful what you wish for on Syria


by: David Ignatius
From: The Australian
September 10, 2012 12:00AM
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THE US and its allies are moving in Syria towards a program of covert support for the rebels that, for better or worse, looks very much like what the US and its friends did in Afghanistan in the 1980s.

In Syria, as in Afghanistan, CIA officers are operating at the borders helping Sunni insurgents improve their command and control, plus other activities. Weapons are coming from third parties (in Afghanistan, they came mostly from China and Egypt; in Syria, they're mainly bought on the black market). A major financier for both insurgencies has been Saudi Arabia.

There's even a colourful figure who links the two campaigns: Prince Bandar bin Sultan, who as Saudi ambassador to Washington in the 80s worked to finance and support the CIA in Afghanistan and who now, as chief of Saudi intelligence, is encouraging operations in Syria.

What does this historical comparison suggest? On the positive side, the Afghan mujaheddin won their war and eventually ousted the Russian-backed government. (Another eerie parallel.) On the negative, this CIA-backed victory opened the way for decades of chaos and jihadist extremism that still menace Afghanistan, its neighbours and even the US.

The Obama administration, to its credit, recognises the dangers ahead. That's one reason President Barack Obama's approach to this war has been cautious and, according to critics, half-hearted and ineffective. But it's the nature of these wars that a little involvement leads to more, and then to still more.

What does history teach us about such interventions that may be useful in the Syrian case? Here are several points to keep in mind as the covert war against Syrian President Bashar al-Assad ripens:

The US should be wary of supporting a Saudi strategy that inevitably is self-interested. The Saudis understandably would prefer that Sunnis who oppose autocratic rule should wage their fight away from the kingdom; Damascus is a far safer venue than Riyadh.

The US should be cautious about embracing the Sunni versus Shi'ite dynamic of the Syrian war. Rage against Shi'ites and their Iranian patrons has been a useful prop for the US and Israel in mobilising Sunni opposition against Assad, who, as an Alawite, is seen as part of the Shi'ite crescent.

But this is a poisonous and potentially ruinous sectarian battle, the kind that nearly destroyed Iraq and Lebanon and is now plunging Syria into the inferno. The Saudis want to fight Shi'ites, yes, and further from home than Bahrain or al-Qatif in the kingdom's eastern province. The US should not endorse the sectarian element of this conflict.

The US should work hard (if secretly) to help the more sensible elements of the Syrian opposition, and limit the influence of extremists. This policy was ignored in Afghanistan, where the US allowed Pakistan (aided by Saudi money) to back the fighters it liked, who turned out to be among the most extreme and dangerous. America is still trying to undo the mess caused by that exercise in realpolitik.

Finally, the US should subtly play the tribal card, which may be as crucial in Syria as in Iraq. The leaders of many tribes have sworn a blood oath of vengeance against Assad, and their power is one reason why the engine of this insurgency is rural, conservative and Sunni. But Iraq showed that the tribal leaders can be the best bulwark against the growth of al-Qa'ida and other extremists.

What's scary about Syria is that al-Qa'ida is already fighting there, in the hundreds. Cells in Mosul and other parts of northern Iraq are sending fighters across the border, the jihadist pipeline now operating in reverse.

Arab intelligence sources tell me the Syrian opposition is laudably battling al-Qa'ida's influence: the opposition killed an al-Qa'ida fighter named Walid Boustani, who tried to declare an emirate in a town near the Lebanese border; it also demolished a cell that raised al-Qa'ida's black flag near Bab al-Salameh, along the Turkish border. Sunni opposition fighters aren't necessarily al-Qa'ida fanatics, in other words.

The rebels fighting Assad deserve limited US support, just as the anti-Soviet mujaheddin did. But be careful: this way lies chaos and extremism that can take a generation to undo if the US and its allies aren't prudent.

src: http://www.theaustralian.com.au/news/world/careful-what-you-wish-for-on-syria/story-e6frg6ux-1226468458803